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The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: 
Death Qualification and Evolving Standards of Decency 
ALIZA PLENER COVER* 
The Supreme Court’s inquiry into the constitutionality of the death penalty has over-
looked a critical “objective indicator” of society’s “evolving standards of decency”: 
the rate at which citizens are excluded from capital jury service under Witherspoon 
v. Illinois due to their conscientious objections to the death penalty. While the 
Supreme Court considers the prevalence of death verdicts as a gauge of the nation’s 
moral climate, it has ignored how the process of death qualification shapes those 
verdicts. This blind spot biases the Court’s estimation of community norms and dis-
torts its Eighth Amendment analysis.  
This Article presents a quantitative study of Witherspoon strikes in real capital 
cases, measuring the strike rate in eleven Louisiana trials resulting in death verdicts 
from 2009 to 2013. Of the 1445 potential jurors questioned, 325 individuals (22.5%) 
were excluded from service on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty. 
These exclusions had a considerable impact on the racial composition of the jury 
pool: in the trials for which individualized information on race was available, one-
third of black venire members were struck under Witherspoon, and nearly sixty per-
cent of those struck on this basis were black. These findings underscore the profound 
impact of death qualification upon the composition of capital juries and the outcomes 
of capital trials. Particularly in the wake of Justice Breyer’s recent call for re-
consideration of the death penalty’s constitutionality, there is an urgent need for 
(a) systematized, ongoing data collection on Witherspoon strikes, and (b) formal 
consideration of the effect of death qualification in future Eighth Amendment 
analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 15, 2015, a federal jury in Massachusetts returned a death verdict in the 
case of convicted Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.1 It was an outcome 
that could only have occurred in federal court: under state law, capital punishment 
had been abolished for thirty years, and Massachusetts saw its last execution in 
1947.2 After Tsarnaev’s conviction and partway through the penalty phase of his 
trial, a Boston Globe poll found that less than twenty percent of Massachusetts resi-
dents and only fifteen percent of Bostonians believed that he should be executed3—
notwithstanding the bloody devastation and citywide paralysis he inflicted.4 The 
same poll found that less than a third of Massachusetts residents and only a quarter 
of Boston residents supported the death penalty under any circumstances for heinous 
crimes.5 Yet twelve jurors, all residents of Massachusetts, unanimously voted for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Katharine Q. Seelye, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Given Death Penalty in Boston Marathon 
Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/us/dzhokhar 
-tsarnaev-death-sentence.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4AM4-X24U]. 
 2. Massachusetts, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo 
.org/massachusetts-0 [https://perma.cc/R5KJ-H3A2]. 
 3. Evan Allen, Few Favor Death for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Poll Finds, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 
26, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/04/26/globe-poll-shows-diminishing-support 
-for-death-penalty-for-tsarnaev/S3GMhFlGj5VUkZrmLzh1iN/story.html [https://web.archive.org 
/web/20160722120516/http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/04/26/globe-poll-shows-diminishing 
-support-for-death-penalty-for-tsarnaev/S3GMhFlGj5VUkZrmLzh1iN/story.html]. 
 4. A WBUR poll conducted just after Tsarnaev’s conviction and before the penalty phase 
found that only 26% of Boston residents, and 31% in the larger Boston area, supported the 
death penalty for Tsarnaev. Asma Khalid, Death Penalty for Tsarnaev Increasingly 
Unpopular, WBUR Poll Finds, WBUR NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/2015/04 
/16/tsarnaev-death-penalty-poll-wbur [https://perma.cc/GP4J-DJV5]. A similar poll in the 
midst of the trial found that 27% of Boston registered voters sampled were in favor of his 
execution. Zeninjor Enwemeka, WBUR Poll: Most in Boston Think Tsarnaev Should Get Life 
in Prison over Death Penalty, WBUR NEWS (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/2015/03 
/23/wbur-poll-tsarnaev-death-penalty-life-in-prison [https://perma.cc/3YNX-KKD6]. A poll 
conducted by the Boston Globe in September of 2013 found that 33% of Bostonians were in 
favor of the death penalty for Tsarnaev. Brian MacQuarrie, In Globe Poll, Most Favor Life 
Term for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com 
/metro/2013/09/15/most-boston-residents-favor-life-without-parole-for-tsarnaev-convicted-poll 
-shows/Ur6ivWIUiYCpEZLXBApHDL/story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20160729171601 
/http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/09/15/most-boston-residents-favor-life-without 
-parole-for-tsarnaev-convicted-poll-shows/Ur6ivWIUiYCpEZLXBApHDL/story.html].  
 5. Allen, supra note 3; see also id. (follow “a Boston Globe poll shows” hyperlink) 
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death in Tsarnaev’s case.6 The disparity between the outcome of Tsarnaev’s trial and 
the strong community opposition to capital punishment suggests that the verdict was 
impacted by death qualification—the process whereby citizens are questioned about 
their views on the death penalty and excluded from jury service if they express 
conscientious objections that may impede their willingness to impose the penalty of 
death.7 Because Tsarnaev’s federal capital case was tried, extraordinarily, in an 
abolitionist state, the impact of death qualification was particularly noteworthy; yet 
death qualification shapes verdicts in death-penalty states nationwide—and there has 
been no systematic accounting for the extent of its impact.  
Death qualification is one of the most striking and distinctive procedural features 
of the modern American system of capital punishment. A rich scholarship has criti-
cally examined the impact of this practice on the fairness of individual capital trials 
under the Sixth Amendment, particularly in terms of producing uncommonly 
conviction- and death-prone juries.8 This Article makes a new contribution by 
focusing on a different issue: the impact of death qualification upon the broader judi-
cial inquiry into whether capital punishment is “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
In assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Supreme Court 
considers aggregate capital trial outcomes as “objective indicia” of our nation’s 
“evolving standards of decency.”9 Tsarnaev’s death verdict, therefore, would be judi-
cial evidence of societal approval of the morality and constitutionality of the death 
penalty—notwithstanding vocal and pervasive community disagreement with the 
practice, and despite the fact that the prosecution was able to obtain that outcome 
only after death qualifying the jury. I argue that, since it looks to capital jury verdicts 
in its Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court must also consider statistics about the 
rate of juror disqualification under Witherspoon10 and its progeny. The process of 
death qualification produces jury verdicts that diverge from community estimations 
of the cruelty of the death penalty; from a statistical standpoint, the data set of capital 
                                                                                                                 
 
(displaying full results of poll), http://www.bostonglobe.com/rw/Boston/2011-2020/WebGraphics 
/Metro/BostonGlobe.com/2015/04/28poll/28poll-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4FJ-MK4W]. 
 6. Katharine Q. Seelye, Jurors Chosen for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s Trial in Boston 
Marathon Bombings, N.Y. TIMES (March 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us 
/boston-marathon-bombing-trial.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20151023141431/http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/boston-marathon-bombing-trial.html]; Milton J. Valencia, 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Gets Death Penalty for Placing Marathon Bomb, BOS. GLOBE (May  
15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/15/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death-penalty 
-sentencing-jury-boston-marathon-bombing/canMEfLmeQJxQ4rFU0sERJ/story.html [https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20160421122241/http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/15/dzhokhar 
-tsarnaev-death-penalty-sentencing-jury-boston-marathon-bombing/canMEfLmeQJxQ4rFU0sERJ 
/story.html]. 
 7. Precise numbers of death-qualified jurors in Tsarnaev’s case are not yet available, as the 
transcripts of jury voir dire have been sealed. See Nancy Gertner, Death Qualified: The Tsarnaev 
Jury, His Sentence and The Questions that Remain, WBUR: COGNOSCENTI (May 28, 2015), 
http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2015/05/28/death-penalty-nancy-gertner [https://perma.cc/JHX5-NKN2].  
 8. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); see infra notes 50–52. 
 10. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).  
116 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:113 
 
jury verdicts is a biased sample. Disqualified jurors are excluded not only from 
capital jury service in each individual case but also from the constitutional 
conversation about whether the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Explicitly incorporating Witherspoon strike rates into the constitutional analysis 
would recover a less biased, more representative data set and would account for the 
voices of citizens who are otherwise silenced through death qualification.11  
My purpose in this Article is to recalibrate the relevance of jury verdicts to the 
Eighth Amendment analysis by incorporating the rate of juror disqualification as an 
objective indicator critical to a meaningful inquiry into the constitutionality of the 
death penalty. This is an important yet narrow—and therefore attainable—goal. 
Discerning society’s “evolving standards of decency” is a fraught endeavor, particu-
larly for a counter-majoritarian institution such as the Supreme Court.12 I do not at-
tempt here to grapple with the countermajoritarian difficulty13 nor to wholly 
reimagine the Court’s role in interpreting the scope of the Eighth Amendment in an 
evolving society. I do not argue here, as others have done, for an overhaul of the 
Court’s “objective indicia” analysis to incorporate public opinion polls, or interna-
tional law, or professional organizations’ expertise.14 I respond, instead, to the 
Court’s existing approach and the parameters that it has already established—
focusing on “objective indicia” of “evolving standards of decency,” composed pri-
marily of (1) legislative action and (2) jury determinations.15 If jury determinations 
are to be used as evidence of society’s views on the death penalty, then the Court 
must also account for the legal process by which those juries were selected and those 
jury determinations obtained: specifically, for the practice of death qualification.16  
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Of course, Witherspoon strike rates—which capture the rate of opposition to the death 
penalty only in those jurisdictions that support capital punishment enough to bring capital 
cases to trial—are not by themselves accurate gauges of national views on the death penalty 
and cannot be substitutes for the existing indicators. One would not expect Louisiana 
Witherspoon strike rates, for example, to match the rate of death penalty opposition nation-
wide, or in non-death-penalty states such as Massachusetts. 
 12. Justice Scalia has been a prominent critic of the malleability of the inquiry. See, e.g., 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 611 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The attempt by the 
Court to turn its remarkable minority consensus into a faux majority . . . is an act of nomologi-
cal desperation.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 341–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (1962). 
 14. See, e.g., David Niven, Jeremy Zilber & Kenneth W. Miller, A “Feeble Effort To 
Fabricate National Consensus”: The Supreme Court’s Measurement of Current Social 
Attitudes Regarding the Death Penalty, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 83, 88–89 (2006). 
 15. I do not argue in this paper that death qualification, along with other voir dire practices 
including hardship excusals, peremptory challenges, and inequities in the venire selection pro-
cesses, so fatally flaws jury verdicts as accurate measures of community standards that they 
should not be considered as objective indicia at all. This argument, however, has some appeal. 
I leave it for another day. 
 16. There are other defects in the objective indicia that the Court uses—for example, the 
legislative trends do not account for low participation levels by members of minority or low-
income groups. But these are sprawling problems that are harder to control for. The bias that 
death qualification places on the objective indicia is a judicially created one, there is a clean 
and reasonably accurate way of measuring the extent of that bias, and that bias could be at 
least partially remedied by the judiciary as well. 
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This recalibration is particularly important today. Most recent constitutional 
litigation before the Supreme Court concerning capital punishment has focused on 
the outer boundaries of the practice, rather than its core. The Supreme Court has not 
reconsidered the constitutionality of the death penalty in its entirety since Gregg v. 
Georgia.17 Instead, recent Supreme Court cases involving challenges to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty have centered on issues such as the execution 
of intellectually disabled defendants18 and juveniles,19 the proportionality of the 
death penalty for the crime of child rape,20 and the constitutionality of the method of 
execution.21 Jury verdicts have played a less central22 role in these decisions than, for 
example, in Furman23 and Gregg. 
In 2015, however, in a historic dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
called upon the Court to reconsider the constitutionality of the death penalty and 
expressed his own belief that “the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely consti-
tutes a legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’”24 In light of this 
pronouncement—made by two justices in a case in which the constitutionality of the 
death penalty was not squarely before the Court—the fundamental validity of the 
practice of capital punishment remains a vital question without a stable answer.25  
The prevalence of death qualification should—if properly accounted for—play a 
critical role in how the Court ultimately resolves the issue. Dissenting in Glossip, 
Justice Breyer asserted that the administration of the death penalty is now “unusual,” 
as “most places within the United States have abandoned its use.”26 Justice Breyer 
identified the steady decline in jurors’ imposition of sentences of death as an im-
portant indicator of the nation’s evolving standards of decency,27 and also empha-
sized that these sentences were concentrated geographically within a small minority 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 18. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
 19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 20. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 21. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
 22. Though less central, jury verdicts have remained pertinent. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
324 n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t is worth noting that experts have estimated that as 
many as 10 percent of death row inmates are mentally retarded, a number which suggests that 
sentencing juries are not as reluctant to impose the death penalty on defendants like petitioner 
as was the case in Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v. Florida.” (citations omitted)). 
 23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 24. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). 
 25. Recently, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg again called for reconsideration of the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty. Tucker v. Louisiana, No. 15-946, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 31, 
2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 181 So. 3d 590 (La. 2015). It is possible that, 
when a new justice is confirmed to fill the empty seat of Justice Scalia, who was a vigorous 
opponent of judicial abolition of the death penalty, the Court will decide to answer that call. 
 26. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 2772–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An appropriate starting point concerns the 
trajectory of the number of annual death sentences nationwide, from the 1970’s to present day. 
In 1977—just after the Supreme Court made clear that, by modifying their legislation, States 
could reinstate the death penalty—137 people were sentenced to death. Many States having 
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of the nation’s counties.28 These facts are especially noteworthy when paired with 
the missing data point that I focus on here: these few death sentences in these few 
jurisdictions were attained only with the critical assistance of death qualification. 
What would these dwindling statistics look like if the conscientious objectors had 
not been stripped from the sentencing juries?  
Because the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry is by its own terms evolving, 
the constitutionality of the death penalty is not fixed. As societal mores change, so 
too should the Court’s jurisprudence. Jury verdicts retain significance today as one 
of the twin pillars of the “evolving standards of decency” analysis. Considering death 
disqualification rates alongside capital jury verdicts would provide critical infor-
mation to the Court about the nation’s values and the continued constitutionality of 
the death penalty. 
In Part I of this Article, I summarize the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on death 
qualification; explain how the practice of death qualification impacts the analysis of 
the constitutionality of capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment; and argue 
that the Court must consider the prevalence of Witherspoon strikes alongside the 
outcomes of jury trials as “objective indicia” of “evolving standards of decency.”  
In Part II, I begin the empirical task of quantifying how death qualification pro-
ceedings shape the composition of capital juries by presenting the results of a study 
on the prevalence of Witherspoon strikes in Louisiana—a deep-South state, far from 
liberal Massachusetts. The purpose of this study is not to precisely delineate how 
frequently Witherspoon strikes are occurring nationwide. The aim, instead, is to pro-
vide an initial set of data to corroborate that Witherspoon strikes are currently hap-
pening with substantial frequency—to establish that death qualification proceedings 
have a constitutionally cognizable impact on the composition of capital juries and, 
thus, the outcome of capital trials nationwide. And, indeed, this study reveals that, 
over a five-year period in Louisiana, just over twenty-two percent of the 1445 poten-
tial jurors in eleven capital cases resulting in a death verdict were struck for cause on 
the basis of their opposition to the death penalty. These Witherspoon strikes, more-
over, had a disproportionate racial impact. For seven of the trials, I was able to access 
individualized information about the race of each venire member. In these trials, 
nearly sixty percent of the prospective jurors who were struck under Witherspoon 
were African American, and more than one-third of all the African Americans in the 
jury venire were struck for cause on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty.  
                                                                                                                 
 
revised their death penalty laws to meet Furman’s requirements, the number of death sen-
tences then increased. Between 1986 and 1999, 286 persons on average were sentenced to 
death each year. But, approximately 15 years ago, the numbers began to decline, and they have 
declined rapidly ever since. In 1999, 279 persons were sentenced to death. Last year, just 73 
persons were sentenced to death.” (citations omitted)). 
 28. Id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Geography also plays an important role in 
determining who is sentenced to death. And that is not simply because some States permit the 
death penalty while others do not. Rather within a death penalty State, the imposition of the 
death penalty heavily depends on the county in which a defendant is tried. Between 2004 and 
2009, for example, just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for 
approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide. And in 2012, just 59 counties 
(fewer than 2% of counties in the country) accounted for all death sentences imposed nation-
wide.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
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In Part III, I propose ways to facilitate the inclusion of Witherspoon strikes into 
the Eighth Amendment analysis. I explore how the Court should incorporate this 
information into its analysis of “evolving standards of decency,” and I suggest a 
method of improving access to Witherspoon data by mandating and streamlining its 
collection on an ongoing basis.  
In Part IV, I step back to discuss how explicit attention to death qualification 
would advance the broader participatory function of the Eighth Amendment, which 
invites (and, indeed, requires) a back-and-forth between Court and citizenry about 
the boundaries of permissible punishment. I identify features of death-qualification 
proceedings that encourage constitutional dialogue and others that suppress it, and I 
emphasize the need to maximize its dialogic features in light of the participatory 
ethos of the Eighth Amendment.  
I. BACKGROUND: HOW WITHERSPOON SKEWS “OBJECTIVE INDICIA” 
OF “EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY”  
Witherspoon v. Illinois and its progeny have approved the practice of death 
qualification: the systematic exclusion of conscientious objectors to the death penalty 
(also known as “Witherspoon excludables”)29 from capital juries. Although some ar-
gue that the current Supreme Court law on death qualification has been erroneously 
interpreted to exclude too many death-averse prospective jurors,30 the practical result 
of the Supreme Court’s death-qualification jurisprudence has been to enable some 
prosecutors to strike for cause virtually any juror with serious reservations about his 
or her ability to impose the death penalty.  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court first approved the practice of death qualification 
in a case that narrowed rather than expanded the state’s ability at voir dire to strike 
jurors opposed to capital punishment. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court prohibited 
the practice of excluding venire members from capital juries “simply because they 
voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious 
scruples against its infliction.”31 The dissenters and some contemporary scholars pre-
dicted that this ruling sounded the death knell for capital punishment.32 Yet it has 
done nothing of the kind. Witherspoon explicitly reserved the state’s authority to 
strike for cause potential jurors 
who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote 
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any 
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167 & n.1 (1986). 
 30. William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure To 
Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 61 (2003); Susan D. 
Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death Qualification, 54 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 677, 688–89, 699 (2002).  
 31. 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). 
 32. Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting) (“If this Court is to hold capital punishment un-
constitutional, I think it should do so forthrightly, not by making it impossible for States to get 
juries that will enforce the death penalty.”); Eric Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: 
The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980 (1984).  
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(2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from 
making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt.33 
Witherspoon thus left room for a modified practice of death qualification to continue. 
And seventeen years later, in Wainwright v. Witt,34 the Court clarified that the 
appropriate standard for exclusion was broader than the language of Witherspoon 
might lead one to believe. After Witt, courts assessing challenges for cause during 
death-qualification proceedings need only ask “whether the juror’s views [on the 
death penalty] would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”35 Significantly, Witt also 
dispensed with Witherspoon’s requirements that the potential juror’s inability to fol-
low the law be “unmistakably clear” or that the vote for life be “automatic.”36 In 
more recent cases, most notably in Uttecht v. Brown,37 the Court has failed to apply 
even Witt’s articulation stringently.38 The end result is a relatively lax standard for 
excluding jurors who have reservations about the death penalty, in the name of 
obtaining an “impartial” jury that would be willing to consider imposing the ultimate 
punishment sanctioned by law.39  
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original). 
 34. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
 35. Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).  
 36. Id. (“We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon’s reference to ‘auto-
matic’ decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved 
with ‘unmistakable clarity.’”). 
 37. 551 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 38. Uttecht stressed that appellate courts reviewing Witherspoon exclusions are to afford 
discretion to the trial court’s determinations. Id. at 7–10. In that case, the Supreme Court up-
held the exclusion of a juror who harbored reservations about the death penalty, explaining 
that his “assurances that he would consider imposing the death penalty and would follow the 
law do not overcome the reasonable inference from his other statements that in fact he would 
be substantially impaired in this case.” Id. at 18. The Court’s holding spurred a strong rebuke 
from Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer: 
Even a juror who is generally opposed to the death penalty cannot permissibly 
be excused for cause so long as he can still follow the law as properly instructed. 
The Court recognizes this principle, and yet the perverse result of its opinion is 
that a juror who is clearly willing to impose the death penalty, but considers the 
severity of that decision carefully enough to recognize that there are certain 
circumstances under which it is not appropriate . . . , is “substantially impaired.” 
It is difficult to imagine, under such a standard, a juror who would not be consid-
ered so impaired, unless he delivered only perfectly unequivocal answers during 
the unfamiliar and often confusing legal process of voir dire and was willing to 
state without hesitation that he would be able to vote for a death sentence under 
any imaginable circumstance.  
Today, the Court has fundamentally redefined—or maybe just mis-
understood—the meaning of “substantially impaired,” and, in doing so, has got-
ten it horribly backwards.  
Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 39. Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court emphasizes that ‘the State has a strong 
interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state 
law prescribes.’ But that does not and cannot mean that jurors must be willing to impose a 
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Importantly, in practice, death qualification is but one avenue for the prosecution 
to prevent conscientious objectors from serving on capital juries. Through the exer-
cise of peremptory strikes, the state is able to exclude even more death-averse jurors 
than permitted under Witt. The process of death qualification identifies those jurors 
who have qualms about the death penalty, and, even when these qualms do not justify 
a for-cause challenge, prosecutors can use their peremptory strikes to exclude those 
jurors from service. The combination of Witherspoon and peremptory strikes leads 
to capital juries that may be stripped of all opponents of capital punishment.40 
The impact of death qualification upon individual capital defendants’ trials—both 
at guilt and sentencing—is well documented and profound. Dissenting in Glossip v. 
Gross, Justice Breyer recently pointed to death qualification as a possible root cause 
of an increased likelihood of wrongful convictions in death penalty cases.41 Death-
qualified jurors are, on the whole, uncommonly conviction- and death-prone, as well 
as disproportionately punitive and inclined toward believing the prosecution.42 The 
process of death qualification itself predisposes jurors to assume the defendant’s 
guilt.43 And, because minorities, and African Americans in particular, tend to be 
more opposed to the death penalty than whites, researchers have predicted that death 
qualification likely strips juries of a disproportionate number of minority jurors.44 As 
                                                                                                                 
 
death sentence in every situation in which a defendant is eligible for that sanction. That is 
exactly the outcome we aimed to protect against in developing the standard that, contrary to 
the Court’s apparent temporary lapse, still governs today.” (citation omitted)). 
 40. Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An 
Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1982) (concluding, 
in an early study of the use of peremptory challenges against death-averse jurors, that “the 
prosecution used peremptory challenges against . . . 77% of the scrupled jurors” and that 
“whereas 13% of the community opposed the death penalty, and 6% opposed it in a manner 
not justifying removal for cause under Witherspoon, fewer than 3% of the actual jurors and 
alternates opposed the death penalty”). 
 41. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2758 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Other factors 
may also play a role. One is the practice of death-qualification; no one can serve on a capital 
jury who is not willing to impose the death penalty.”).  
 42. BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER, JUROR’S STORIES OF DEATH: HOW AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY 24–25 (2004); Mike Allen, Edward Mabry & Drue-Marie 
McKelton, Impact of Juror Attitudes About the Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt 
and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 715, 724–25 (1998); Bowers & 
Foglia, supra note 30, at 84–86; Brooke M. Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death 
Qualification in Venirepersons’ Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in 
Capital Trials, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 183 (2002); Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. 
Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 147, 159–61 (1996); Niven, et al., supra note 14, at 107–08; Susan D. Rozelle, 
The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 784–85 (2006); William C. Thompson, Claudia L. Cowan, Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth & Joan C. Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The 
Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 97 (1984).  
 43. E.g., Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process 
Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 134 (1984); Niven et al., supra note 14, at 108. 
 44. See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: 
Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46 (1984) (finding that 
more African Americans and women are likely struck from capital juries than whites and 
122 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:113 
 
I will discuss later in the Article, my findings provide empirical confirmation of this 
phenomenon. 
It bears mention that the Supreme Court has insisted upon a measure of reciprocity 
in the exclusion of jurors on account of their views on the death penalty. Jurors are 
subjected to “life qualification” as well as death qualification; in other words, jurors 
who are unable to meaningfully consider imposing a life sentence rather than the 
death penalty may also be struck for cause.45 However, the practice of life qualifica-
tion does not overcome the impact of Witherspoon and Witt. First, because of the 
unanimity requirement for a death verdict in most capital jurisdictions,46 a single 
seated capital juror who fundamentally opposes the death penalty can have a decisive 
role in the verdict reached. The same is not true of automatic-death jurors. Thus, 
seating a single Morgan-excludable juror may make a death verdict more likely, but 
that verdict will still require the agreement of eleven other individuals. The practice 
of death qualification, rather than life qualification, thus has a more direct impact on 
the verdict reached. Second, judges often apply inconsistent standards to challenges 
of automatic-life and automatic-death jurors, more readily dismissing potential jurors 
for cause based on their opposition to the death penalty.47 And, while some—but 
few—genuinely “death-disqualified” (or automatic-life) jurors ultimately serve on 
capital juries, there is strong empirical evidence that a large number of “life-
disqualified” (or automatic-death) jurors make it into the jury box.48 There is 
                                                                                                                 
 
men); Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the Death Penalty 
in America, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 996, 1006 (2007) (finding that African Americans are both 
more opposed to the death penalty and more receptive to arguments against it); J. Thomas 
Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1134–47 (2014) (explaining how disparate racial attitudes on the death 
penalty may combine with death qualification proceedings to rid juries of minority jurors); 
Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll: Who Supports the Death Penalty?, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR 
(Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/gallup-poll-who-supports-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/ML3L-NK3G] (finding that “71% of whites support the death penalty, com-
pared with only 44% of blacks”). 
 45. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (“A juror who will automatically vote 
for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a 
juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the 
requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains 
such views. If even one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State 
is disentitled to execute the sentence.”). 
 46. Alabama, which also permits a judicial override of the jury’s advisory verdict, is one 
noteworthy exception to the ordinary rule for unanimity. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) 
(LexisNexis 2015) (“The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must be based 
on a vote of at least 10 jurors.”). 
 47. John Holdridge, Selecting Capital Jurors Uncommonly Willing to Condemn a Man to 
Die: Lower Courts’ Contradictory Readings of Wainwright v. Witt and Morgan v. Illinois, 19 
MISS. C. L. REV. 283, 290–91 (1999). 
 48. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & A. Brian Threlkeld, Probing “Life 
Qualification” Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1212 & n.8 (2001) 
(noting that “[i]n contrast to the small number of ‘death unqualified’ jurors who actually serve 
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widespread agreement that the cumulative impact of Witherspoon proceedings 
—even as moderated by Morgan—is to yield juries more death prone than the 
communities from which their members were drawn.49 
While numerous scholars have explored these consequences of death qualification 
from the perspective of individual defendants’ rights, this Article considers, instead, 
the trickle-down effect that death qualification has upon the evolution of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence on the constitutionality of capital punishment as a whole 
in our country. The Supreme Court has justified the practice of death qualification, 
and set limits upon it, by invoking the respective interests of the state and the defend-
ant in obtaining an impartial jury in an individual trial.50 Yet capital jury verdicts 
have a larger impact on the evolution of death-penalty law beyond their well-
established effect upon the fate of individual defendants, and the Court has never 
accounted for the practice of death qualification in this broader, aggregate use of 
capital-jury verdicts. 
The centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the constitutionality of the 
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment is its analysis of society’s “evolving 
standards of decency.”51 To determine whether a particular punishment practice com-
ports with these “evolving standards,” the Court looks to “objective factors to the 
maximum possible extent”52 and has specifically approved two reference points 
—“the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures” and “data concerning the 
                                                                                                                 
 
in capital cases, far larger numbers of jurors who are not ‘life qualified’ serve in capital cases” 
and citing sources (emphasis in original)); Bowers & Foglia, supra note 30, at 62–63 (conclud-
ing, based on interview data and prior research, that “[q]uite clearly, the jury selection process 
eliminated nearly all persons who thought the death penalty was unacceptable as punishment 
for these crimes and failed to remove a great many who believed death was the only acceptable 
punishment for these offenses”). 
 49. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 48, at 1212; Bowers & Foglia, supra note 30, at 60–
66, 84–85; Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Our Existential Death Penalty: Judges, Jurors, and Terror 
Management, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 77 (2008); James S. Liebman, The 
Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2097 & n.164 (2000); Rozelle, supra 
note 42, at 784–89; Rozelle, supra note 30, at 690–96.  
 50. E.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (“The State may insist . . . that jurors 
will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by 
the court.”). Notably, neither Witherspoon nor Witt accepted the theory that the Sixth 
Amendment fair-cross-section guarantee prohibited the exclusion of a segment of the commu-
nity with scruples against the death penalty. In Lockhart v. McCree, the Court explicitly ruled 
that the fair-cross-section guarantee did not apply to the petit jury and also disagreed that the 
practice of death qualification violated that guarantee in any event. 476 U.S. 162, 176–77 
(1986) (“In sum, ‘Witherspoon-excludables,’ or for that matter any other group defined solely 
in terms of shared attitudes that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a 
particular case, may be excluded from jury service without contravening any of the basic 
objectives of the fair-cross-section requirement. It is for this reason that we conclude that 
‘Witherspoon-excludables’ do not constitute a ‘distinctive group’ for fair-cross-section 
purposes, and hold that ‘death qualification’ does not violate the fair-cross-section 
requirement.” (citation omitted)). 
 51. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 100–01 (1958)). 
 52. Id. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)). 
124 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:113 
 
actions of sentencing juries”—as the primary objective indicia.53 The Court has on 
occasion—and, in recent years, increasingly—considered other evidence, including 
international and foreign law,54 viewpoints of professional organizations,55 and 
public-opinion polls,56 but these sources remain controversial57 and have not been 
explicitly endorsed as reliable indicators of “evolving standards of decency” nor re-
lied upon to resolve cases under the Eighth Amendment. “Objective indicia” alone 
are not the sole determinants of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: “[I]n 
cases involving a [national] consensus, [the Court’s] own judgment is ‘brought to 
bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the 
citizenry and its legislators.”58 However, the “objective indicia” analysis remains 
central to the Court’s inquiry. 
The use of capital-jury verdicts as one of the two primary “objective indicia” of 
“evolving standards of decency” rests on the notion that juries serve as a link between 
punishments and the conscience of the community.59 Although the twelve-member 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 
536 U.S. 304. 
 54. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). For an interesting discus-
sion of how international norms have entered the Eighth Amendment inquiry in America 
through more indirect routes, see James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs 
and the International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215 (2015). 
 55. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993–97 (2014). 
 56. “In recent years, the Supreme Court has even shown willingness to consult controver-
sial alternative sources—such as the policy preferences of foreign countries and international 
bodies, as well as private professional associations—in order to determine what current stand-
ards of decency require.” John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth 
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1751–52 (2008) (citing 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78, and Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21). But see Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 
(“The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions may ultimately find 
expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which 
we can rely.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“In my view, these two 
sources—the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations—ought to be 
the sole indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of de-
cency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. They are the only objective indicia of 
contemporary values firmly supported by our precedents. More importantly, however, they 
can be reconciled with the undeniable precepts that the democratic branches of government 
and individual sentencing juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and 
giving effect to the complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of 
publicly acceptable criminal punishments.”). 
 58. Id. at 312–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 59. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181–82 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The jury also is 
a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly in-
volved. The Court has said that ‘one of the most important functions any jury can perform in 
making . . . a selection [between life imprisonment and death for a defendant convicted in a 
capital case] is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal 
system.’ It may be true that evolving standards have influenced juries in recent decades to be 
more discriminating in imposing the sentence of death. But the relative infrequency of jury 
verdicts imposing the death sentence does not indicate rejection of capital punishment per se. 
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jury represents a tiny fraction of the population of any given jurisdiction, and 
although statistical representativeness on the petit jury is not required,60 the unanim-
ity61 of jury verdicts provides at least some assurance that those verdicts can be said 
to substantially represent the community estimation of fairness. 62  
                                                                                                                 
 
Rather, the reluctance of juries in many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the 
humane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number 
of extreme cases. Indeed, the actions of juries in many States since Furman are fully compati-
ble with the legislative judgments, reflected in the new statutes, as to the continued utility and 
necessity of capital punishment in appropriate cases. At the close of 1974 at least 254 persons 
had been sentenced to death since Furman, and by the end of March 1976, more than 460 
persons were subject to death sentences.” (alteration and omission in original) (footnotes and 
citations omitted) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968))); accord 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have, in our determination of society’s 
moral standards, consulted the practices of sentencing juries: Juries ‘“maintain a link between 
contemporary community values and the penal system”’ that this Court cannot claim for it-
self.” (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181)); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Our opinions have also recognized that data concerning the actions of sentencing juries, 
though entitled to less weight than legislative judgments, ‘“is a significant and reliable objec-
tive index of contemporary values”’ because of the jury’s intimate involvement in the case 
and its function of “‘maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the 
penal system”’. In Coker, for example, we credited data showing that “at least 9 out of 10” 
juries in Georgia did not impose the death sentence for rape convictions. And in Enmund v. 
Florida, where evidence of the current legislative judgment was not as “compelling” as that 
in Coker (but more so than that here), we were persuaded by “overwhelming [evidence] that 
American juries . . . repudiated imposition of the death penalty” for a defendant who neither 
took life nor attempted or intended to take life.” (citations omitted) (first quoting Coker, 433 
U.S. at 596; then quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181; then quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596–97; 
and then quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793–94 (1982))). 
 60. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 n.6 (1986) (“[T]hough the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees that the petit jury will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross section 
of the community, we have never held that the Sixth Amendment requires that ‘petit juries 
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population.’ Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation 
to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illus-
trated by the Court’s holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional.” (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975))). 
 61. Or, in noncapital cases in Louisiana and Oregon and in capital penalty-phase proceed-
ings in Alabama, nonunanimous but still supermajoritarian jury verdicts. LA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 17(A) (“A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be 
tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.”); OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 11 (“[I]n the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of 
guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be 
found only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise . . . .”); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) 
(LexisNexis 2015) (“The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must be based 
on a vote of at least 10 jurors.”). 
 62. To strengthen the connectivity between community norms and jury sentences, some 
have advocated against the Supreme Court’s more than century-old formal prohibition on jury 
nullification, announced in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101–02 (1895). E.g., United 
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1141–42 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“My own view rests on the premise that nullification can and 
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Yet this view does not account for the impact of death qualification upon the 
representativeness of the capital jury. Death qualification eliminates from jury ser-
vice a sizable portion of the population that disagrees with the morality of the death 
penalty and therefore prevents jury verdicts from accurately reflecting the stance of 
the community on whether the death penalty is “cruel and unusual.”63  
In invoking juries as measures of public sentiment, the Court has failed to 
acknowledge the impact of death qualification.64 For instance, dissenting in Furman 
v. Georgia, Justice Powell justified the use of jury verdicts as a measure of “evolving 
standards of decency” as follows: 
The second and even more direct source of information reflecting the 
public’s attitude toward capital punishment is the jury. In Witherspoon 
v. Illinois, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by JUSTICES BRENNAN and 
MARSHALL, characterized the jury’s historic function in the sentencing 
process in the following terms: 
“[T]he jury is given broad discretion to decide whether or not death is 
‘the proper penalty’ in a given case, and a juror’s general views about 
capital punishment play an inevitable role in any such decision. 
“A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors 
it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and 
can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror. . . . Guided by neither rule nor 
standard, . . . a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capi-
tal punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than ex-
press the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or 
death.” 
“[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making 
                                                                                                                 
 
should serve an important function in the criminal process. I do not see it as a doctrine that 
exists only because we lack the power to punish jurors who refuse to enforce the law or to re-
prosecute a defendant whose acquittal cannot be justified in the strict terms of law. The doc-
trine permits the jury to bring to bear on the criminal process a sense of fairness and particular-
ized justice. The drafters of legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of every case where 
a defendant’s conduct is ‘unlawful’ but not blameworthy, any more than they can draw a bold 
line to mark the boundary between an accident and negligence. It is the jury—as spokesman 
for the community’s sense of values—that must explore that subtle and elusive boundary.”). 
 63. Of course, there are other reasons why capital-jury verdicts don’t accurately capture 
the nation’s views on the death penalty, including the fact that they are concentrated in the 
geographic regions where the death penalty is most popular and where the citizenry are most 
supportive of bringing death cases in the first place. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to 
the fact that the death penalty is carried out in a small minority of counties across the country. 
See Robert J. Smith, Essay, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 227 (2012). However, this paper focuses on the particular impact of death 
qualification and how to remedy the distortions that this practice creates—particularly because 
it is a judicially created practice and the Court has a special role in remedying it. 
 64. And while the Court has explicitly rejected the argument that death qualification de-
prives a defendant of a jury comprised of a fair cross section of the community, Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176–77 (1986), this impact for Eighth Amendment purposes requires 
a different analysis, because the question here is not the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury but rather the accuracy of the gauge of the nation’s evolving standards of 
decency.  
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such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community 
values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of 
punishment could hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 
Any attempt to discern, therefore, where the prevailing standards of de-
cency lie must take careful account of the jury’s response to the question 
of capital punishment.65  
Having thus established the relevance of jury verdicts to the inquiry into “evolving 
standards of decency” under the Eighth Amendment, Justice Powell went on to argue 
that the rate of death verdicts was consistent with the constitutionality of capital 
punishment.66  
Yet Justice Powell’s citation of Witherspoon to establish the relevance of jury 
verdicts to community consensus is rather incongruous. The portion of Witherspoon 
quoted, if read in full, gave an aspirational description of the jury’s link to the 
community while arguing that a jury system excluding people with conscientious 
objections against the death penalty could not fully express the community’s stand-
ards of decency. The full quotation reads as follows: 
A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, 
can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and 
can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror. But a jury from which all such 
men have been excluded cannot perform the task demanded of it. Guided 
by neither rule nor standard, “free to select or reject as it [sees] fit,” a 
jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment 
can do little more—and must do nothing less—than express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. Yet, 
in a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a 
jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the 
community. Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital 
punishment—of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. 408 U.S. 238, 439–41 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (footnote 
and citations omitted) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968)). 
 66. Id. at 441 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“During the 1960’s juries returned in excess of a 
thousand death sentences, a rate of approximately two per week. Whether it is true that death 
sentences were returned in less than 10% of the cases as petitioners estimate or whether some 
higher percentage is more accurate, these totals simply do not support petitioners’ assertion at 
oral argument that ‘the death penalty is virtually unanimously repudiated and condemned by 
the conscience of contemporary society.’ It is also worthy of note that the annual rate of death 
sentences has remained relatively constant over the last 10 years and that the figure for 1970—
127 sentences—is the highest annual total since 1961. It is true that the sentencing rate might 
be expected to rise, rather than remain constant, when the number of violent crimes increases 
as it has in this country. And it may be conceded that the constancy in these statistics indicates 
the unwillingness of juries to demand the ultimate penalty in many cases where it might be 
imposed. But these considerations fall short of indicating that juries are imposing the death 
penalty with such rarity as to justify this Court in reading into this circumstance a public rejec-
tion of capital punishment.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at  21, 
Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972) (No. 68-5027))). 
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penalty—such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling 
minority.67 
Decisions made by juries stripped of conscientious objectors to the death penalty 
do not accurately reflect contemporary standards of decency about the death penalty. 
The use of death-qualified jury verdicts as “objective indicia” of contemporary val-
ues produces an obviously warped data set from which to gauge “evolving standards 
of decency.”68 As aptly put by Ben Cohen and Robert Smith, 
Measuring the community’s sentiment concerning a specific punishment 
by gathering a venire, removing from the venire all people opposed to a 
punishment, and then taking the temperature of the remaining citizens 
concerning the propriety of that punishment, would be like assessing the 
impact of global warming by taking the temperature in a room with its 
air-conditioning on.69 
In fact, the very existence of the practice of death qualification—and the insistence 
by prosecutors that it is necessary—bears constitutional significance within any 
accurate assessment of “evolving standards of decency.” As Justice Stevens has noted,  
Litigation involving both challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges has persuaded me that the process of obtaining a “death qualified 
jury” is really a procedure that has the purpose and effect of obtaining a 
jury that is biased in favor of conviction. The prosecutorial concern that 
death verdicts would rarely be returned by 12 randomly selected jurors 
should be viewed as objective evidence supporting the conclusion that 
the penalty is excessive.70 
An additional concern about the impact of death qualification on the “evolving 
standards of decency” inquiry is the disproportionate exclusion of minorities—and, 
in particular, African Americans—from the constitutional conversation.71 Death 
qualification is an important—though by no means the only72—feature of capital jury 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519–20 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting People v. Bernette, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443 (Ill. 1964)). 
 68. Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The 
Supreme Court’s Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 455, 537, 542–43, 554 (1996). 
 69. G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 1, 99 n.54 (2008). 
 70. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 71. See sources cited supra note 44. 
 72. Other features of jury selection that may have a disproportionate impact on minority 
venire members include use of voter registration rolls as the pool of qualified jurors, see, e.g., 
Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section 
Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 178 n.196 (2012); 
peremptory strikes exercised against racial minorities, see, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 5 (2010), 
http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc 
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selection that leads to “whitewashing” of juries and calls into question whether capi-
tal jury verdicts are truly representative of community values. Reincorporating 
Witherspoon strikes into the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry would recap-
ture some of the minority voices otherwise excluded from the conversation.73  
Despite the common-sense reasons why the Court should account for death 
qualification in assessing “evolving standards of decency,” it has never done so. As 
a result, the Court’s conclusions that the death penalty is not “cruel and unusual 
punishment” have been buoyed by an inflated and inaccurate estimation of popular 
support for the death penalty. 
II. MEASURING THE RATE OF WITHERSPOON STRIKES IN LOUISIANA CAPITAL 
CASES: AN EMPIRICAL BEGINNING 
This Article has thus far identified a problem with the Supreme Court’s approach 
to measuring evolving standards of decency: its failure to account for the impact of 
death qualification upon capital jury verdicts. There is a second, underlying problem, 
however, which undoubtedly contributes to the Court’s failure in this area: the lack 
of comprehensive data on the rate of Witherspoon exclusion in actual capital trials.  
Social-science surveys suggest that a substantial percentage of people would be 
subject to Witherspoon challenges were they in a capital venire.74 And anecdotal 
statistics from various prominent Supreme Court opinions establish that in at least 
some cases, the rate of strikes on the basis of objections to the death penalty can be 
substantial. In Witherspoon itself, “47 veniremen [out of 95]75 were successfully 
challenged for cause on the basis of their attitudes toward the death penalty.”76 In 
Wainwright v. Witt, “the court excused 11 venirepersons for cause because they 
expressed opposition to the death penalty.”77 In Morgan v. Illinois, “[s]eventeen 
                                                                                                                 
 
/6NWJ-K35U]; and exclusion of ex-felons from juries, see, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion 
of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 113–14 (2003). 
 73. I will pause here to note that the distorting effect of death qualification is sharper than 
any distorting effect brought about by so-called “life qualification,” the corresponding require-
ment that sitting jurors be able to meaningfully consider imposing a life sentence rather than 
death. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). This is so for at least the two reasons 
discussed earlier in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 45–49. First, due to the 
ordinary unanimity requirement for a death verdict in capital jury decision making, the impact 
of any single Witherspoon exclusion is more profound than the impact of any single Morgan 
exclusion, and thus the aggregate impact of Witherspoon is likely much greater than the 
aggregate impact of Morgan. Second, the Morgan standard has proved, in practice, less adept 
at removing automatic-death jurors from the jury box than has the Witherspoon-Witt standard. 
All this being said, I certainly do not oppose the collection of data regarding strike rates under 
Morgan. A comparative inquiry into the number of Witherspoon- and Morgan-excluded jurors 
would be an interesting and important one. 
 74. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 44, at 40–42 (finding 17.2% of a random sam-
ple of 811 eligible jurors in Alameda County, California, to be Witherspoon excludables). 
 75. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 530 n.12 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 514. Note, of course, that not all of these could be legally excluded 
post-Witherspoon. 
 77. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 469 U.S. 412 
(1985); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 415 n.1 (1985). 
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potential jurors were excused when they expressed substantial doubts about their 
ability to follow Illinois law in deciding whether to impose a sentence of death.”78 In 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, fully forty-four jurors were excused for cause on the basis of 
conscientious objections to the death penalty.79 
One early study by Professor Bruce Winick collected data on capital-trial voir dire 
proceedings in one judicial district in Florida from 1974 to 1978 in order to analyze 
prosecutorial use of peremptory strikes against death-averse jurors.80 In so doing, 
Professor Winick presented data from which a Witherspoon strike rate could be esti-
mated.81 However, the study did not provide precise numbers of Witherspoon-struck 
jurors, and the data is at this point nearly four decades old.  
There is no recent statistical information available about the aggregate rate of 
Witherspoon strikes across capital trials. This data is buried in attorneys’ notes and 
in transcripts of the jury voir dire proceedings in individual capital cases. Strike data 
are enormously labor intensive to obtain and to aggregate in a meaningful way.82  
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. 504 U.S. 719, 722–23 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 79. Cohen & Smith, supra note 69, at 98–99 (“Nearly a century and a half later, in 2003, 
Patrick Kennedy was tried by a Louisiana jury on the charge of capital rape of a child. During 
voir dire, the state successfully challenged for cause forty-four jurors due to their conscientious 
objection to the death penalty. Seventeen of the challenged jurors would consider the death 
penalty for the crime of murder, but refused to do so for child rape.” (footnotes omitted)). 
Interestingly, the seventeen jurors excused because of their unwillingness to impose death for 
child rape anticipated the Supreme Court’s own conclusion in reviewing Kennedy’s death 
sentence that the death penalty is “cruel and unusual punishment” for the nonhomicidal rape 
of a child. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008). 
 80. Winick, supra note 40. 
 81. Id. at 28 & n.98. 
 82. It should also be noted that the information contained in reported (and unreported) 
death penalty opinions dealing with Witherspoon challenges in a commercial database such as 
Westlaw or LexisNexis does not produce useful aggregate data. I make this assertion after 
embarking on precisely such an endeavor, without fruitful results. The information available 
in published opinions varies widely from decision to decision. Some provide specific numbers 
about how many jurors in total were struck for cause and for what reasons. See, e.g., United 
States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that 101 venire members were 
questioned, that twenty-five were excused by the court due to personal hardship, that eleven 
of the sixteen venire members challenged for cause by the defendant were excused, that eleven 
of the fourteen venire members challenged by the government excused for cause, that each 
side got twenty peremptory challenges, and that on appeal the defendant challenged the grant 
of four of the prosecutor’s for-cause challenges on Witherspoon grounds for being merely anti-
death penalty). Some provide only information about the for-cause strikes that are being 
challenged. See, e.g., Young v. Stephens, No. MO-07-CA-002-RAJ, 2014 WL 509376, at 
*106–15 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2014) (evaluating the challenge as to the dismissal of one 
potential juror for cause under Witherspoon). Some provide no numbers whatsoever but only 
mention that Witherspoon strikes occurred. See, e.g., Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 978 
(6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“At the voir dire, the prosecutor was successful in 
having the court excuse for cause those jurors predisposed to disfavor the death penalty.”). It 
is thus nearly impossible to aggregate the information and analyze the data in a meaningful 
way without scrutinizing the individual trial transcripts at insurmountable cost and with a 
prohibitive amount of labor. Moreover, a Westlaw or LexisNexis survey cannot accurately 
identify all the Witherspoon strikes in all capital cases in the country. It necessarily only 
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We need a more comprehensive and systematic consideration of the rate of 
Witherspoon strikes in capital trials. This Article takes the first strides toward an 
empirical assessment of the present impact of death qualification by reporting on the 
results of Witherspoon voir dire in eleven Louisiana capital trials over five years, 
between 2009 and 2013, in which 1445 individual jurors were questioned about their 
views on the death penalty. Although we cannot extrapolate nationwide Witherspoon 
strike rates from this sample, this data set provides important evidentiary confirma-
tion that death-qualification proceedings have a constitutionally significant impact 
on the composition of capital juries and the outcomes of capital trials. 
A. Methodology 
My study involved a review of all available jury voir dire transcripts from capital 
trials in Louisiana that resulted in a death verdict during the five-year period from 
2009 to 2013. I focused the study on cases that resulted in a death verdict because 
these cases purportedly constitute objective indicia of society’s continued acceptance 
of the death penalty, and as such it is particularly important to understand the impact 
of death qualification in obtaining these death verdicts. In other words, these cases 
are check marks in the column of judicial evidence that the death penalty is not “cruel 
and unusual punishment” under prevailing community norms. How many potential 
jurors were struck from service in these trials because of their conscientious objec-
tions to the death penalty, and to what extent are these “check marks” actually 
recorded in the correct column? 
Upon consulting with capital attorneys who track such information in the state 
and comparing this data to that reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, I was 
able to identify a total of twenty-seven capital trials and fourteen death verdicts in 
the state of Louisiana during the five-year period from 2009 to 2013.83 I conducted 
                                                                                                                 
 
includes the information that is reported in decisions contained in the database. As a result, 
the data would either overestimate or underestimate the rate of Witherspoon strikes 
nationwide. The survey necessarily would not pick up on cases in which no jurors were struck 
for cause, because there would be no Witherspoon challenge to the death qualification 
proceedings. This would lead to an overestimation of the rate of Witherspoon strikes. To the 
extent that an opinion is likely to specify the total number or percentage of jurors struck for 
cause in cases in which a large number of Witherspoon strikes were made, this survey would 
overestimate the rate of Witherspoon strikes. And the survey necessarily would not pick up on 
the rate of Witherspoon strikes in cases in which there was (a) no appeal at all—whether 
because the defendant was acquitted, because the defendant did not receive the death penalty, 
because the defendant did not wish to appeal, or because some kind of plea agreement was 
entered after jury selection; (b) no challenge to the exclusion of jurors under Witherspoon, 
despite the fact that some jurors were excluded; (c) no opinion reported on Westlaw; or (d) no 
information concrete enough in the opinion to provide meaningful data. This would lead to an 
underestimation of the rate of Witherspoon strikes. 
 83. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has reported twelve death sentences in Louisiana 
between 2009 and 2013. TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 231676, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (Georgette Walsh 
& Jill Duncan eds., 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp09st.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/N9ZU-GUYH] (reporting three death sentences in 2009); TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236510, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010—
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STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (Jill Thomas ed., 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5US5-ZRDW] (reporting two death sentences in 2010); TRACY L. SNELL, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 242185, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
2011—STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (Jill Thomas ed., 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf 
/cp11st.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUA7-D4SE] (reporting five death sentences in 2011); TRACY 
L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 245789, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (Lockheed Martin & Jill Thomas eds., 2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp12st.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7JB-GLZZ] (reporting 
two death sentences in 2012); TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 248448, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 9 (Lynn McConnell 
& Morgan Young eds., 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6HJB-7UV9] (reporting zero death sentences in 2013). 
The data I collected after consultation with capital attorneys in the state of Louisiana 
reflects fourteen death verdicts during the same time period. The discrepancy likely stems 
from the fact that the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports prisoners received under sentences of 
death rather than jury verdicts of death. According to the data I collected, in 2009 there were 
at least seven capital trials, three of which resulted in a death verdict: Tyrone Wells, Barry 
Ferguson, Amy Hebert, Felton Dorsey (death verdict), Michael Anderson (death verdict), 
James Magee (death verdict), and Tyrone Wells (retrial after hung jury). In 2010, there were 
at least three capital trials, two of which resulted in death verdicts: Dacarius Holliday (death 
verdict), Brian Horn (death verdict), and Alfred Jones. In 2011, there were at least nine capital 
trials, six of which resulted in death verdicts: Lamondre Tucker (death verdict), Isaiah Doyle 
(death verdict), Jeffrey Clark (death verdict), Robert McCoy (death verdict), Eric Mickelson 
(death verdict), Darrill Henry, Robert Carley, Michael Varnado, David Brown (death verdict), 
and David Baker. Note that the discrepancy between my 2011 and 2012 data and the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics 2011 and 2012 data stems from the fact that Robert McCoy was tried in 
2011, and the jury recommended death in 2011, but the sentence was not imposed until 2012. 
Because it counts death prisoners entered under sentence of death, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics counts Mr. McCoy in 2012; I have counted his trial in 2011. In 2012, there were at 
least four capital trials, one of which resulted in a death verdict: Kenneth Barnes, Robert 
Coleman (death verdict), Sam Jordan, and Christopher Cope. In 2013, there were at least four 
capital trials, two of which resulted in a death verdict: Daniel Prince, Marcus Reed (death 
verdict), Barry Edge, and Rodricus Crawford (death verdict). Again, there is a discrepancy 
here with data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which reported no death sentences; it is 
logical to assume that these individuals were not judicially sentenced to death and thus were 
not tallied in the government data. 
 84. The trials discussed are, from oldest to most recent, Felton Dorsey (Caddo Parish, 
May 2009; convicted as charged; death verdict recommended); James Magee (St. Tammany 
Parish, October 2009; convicted as charged; death verdict recommended); Isaiah Doyle 
(Jefferson Parish, March 2011; convicted as charged; death verdict recommended); Lamondre 
Tucker (Caddo Parish, May 2011; convicted as charged; death verdict recommended); Jeffrey 
Clark (St. Tammany Parish jury sitting in St. Francisville Parish, May 2011; convicted as 
charged; death verdict recommended); Robert McCoy (Bossier Parish, August 2011; con-
victed as charged; death verdict recommended); Eric Mickelson (Caddo Parish, August 2011; 
convicted as charged; death verdict recommended); David Brown (St. Tammany Parish jury 
sitting in St. Francisville Parish, October 2011; convicted as charged; death verdict 
recommended); Robert Coleman (Caddo Parish, January 2012; convicted as charged; death 
verdict recommended); Marcus Reed (Caddo Parish, September 2013; convicted as charged; 
death verdict recommended); Rodricus Crawford (Caddo Parish, November 2013; convicted 
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to case-specific circumstances, I was unable to review the transcripts of three of the 
fourteen cases.85 My study thus includes 78.6% of the capital trials resulting in a 
death verdict over the five-year period. These eleven trials encompassed the 
questioning of 1445 venire members. From the review of these transcripts, I was able 
to compile statistics about the patterns of Witherspoon strikes in these eleven cases.  
Four of these transcripts also contained information on the record about the race 
of each potential juror.86 From this additional information, I gathered statistics about 
the racial impact of death qualification in these trials. Beyond this, I obtained demo-
graphic information available through the Louisiana Secretary of State about each 
individual registered voter on the voter registration rolls in one parish—Caddo 
Parish—in the years 2009 and 2013. By comparing the names of venire members in 
the voir dire transcripts to the information about listed registered voters’ race, I com-
piled statistics about the racial impact of death qualification in three additional trials. 
Thus, this Article reports individualized findings about the racial impact of death 
qualification in seven of the eleven trials.  
The results of the study are detailed below. 
B. Results 
1. Witherspoon Strike Rates 
As detailed below in Table 1, an analysis of the full data set of eleven cases reveals 
that an average of 22.2%,87 between one-fifth and one-quarter, of the jury venire was 
struck for cause on the basis of Witherspoon due to inability to meaningfully consider 
imposing the death penalty.88 A total of 325 venire members out of 1445 venire mem-
bers questioned were excused for cause on this basis.89 The highest percentage of 
                                                                                                                 
 
as charged; death verdict recommended). It should be noted that the trial transcript reviewed 
for David Brown is a draft version; his official record has not yet been lodged in the Supreme 
Court. 
 85. These cases are Michael Anderson (whose conviction was overturned with the grant 
of a motion for new trial, and who ultimately pled nolo contendere to the murder charges, with 
no appeal ever being filed and no appellate record lodged) and Brian Horn and Dacarius 
Holliday (whose appellate records had not yet been lodged at the time of the study). 
 86. Race data was placed on the record in the trials of Robert Coleman, Lamondre Tucker, 
Eric Mickelson (although the race data is missing for fifteen venire members in that case), and 
Isaiah Doyle. 
 87. The median percentage was 22.6%. The percentage of 22.2% was arrived at by 
averaging the total excusal rate for each of the eleven trials. A nearly identical number is 
reached if one takes the percentage of individual jurors excluded across the eleven trials. A 
total of 325 venire members out of 1445 venire members questioned were excused for cause 
on the basis of their objections to the death penalty, which yields a percentage of 22.5%. 
 88. Within this category, I included jurors struck under Witherspoon and jurors struck 
under LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 798 (2013), which codifies Witherspoon into state law.  
 89. Interestingly, the Witherspoon strike rate I find is three times that estimated in 
Professor Winick’s earlier study. He found that 147 out of 1116 jurors expressed scruples 
against the death penalty and that ninety-two of these jurors were excluded for cause. Winick, 
supra note 40, at 30 tbl.1. He then estimated, without analyzing the record-based reasons for 
each individual exclusion, that seventy-four of these jurors were dismissed on Witherspoon 
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Witherspoon strikes in a single case in which a death verdict was issued was 32.1%.90 
In no case was the excusal rate lower than 10%. In raw numbers, rather than percent-
ages, across all the cases an average of 29.5 potential jurors were struck under 
Witherspoon in each voir dire proceeding.  
By contrast, the rate of strikes of “automatic death penalty” jurors under Morgan 
v. Illinois was considerably lower. Within this category I counted both individuals 
who were struck because they believed that death was the only appropriate punish-
ment and individuals who were struck because they were unable to meaningfully 
consider mitigating information. An average of 12.4% of venire members were “life 
disqualified” in these eleven trials.91 In raw numbers, a total of 192 venire members 
out of the 1445 questioned were excused for cause on the basis of their inability to 
consider a life sentence or mitigating factors. 
In an important respect, these reported rates underrepresent the percentage of the 
viable jury pool removed under Witherspoon and Morgan. In many of these voir dire 
proceedings, inquiries as to personal hardship and other bases for excusal (such as 
personal connections to the case) occurred during or before the Witherspoon 
proceedings, so potential jurors were struck for other reasons without ever reaching 
a determination on the question of death qualification. This means that the above 
percentages of Witherspoon-disqualified jurors may substantially underestimate the 
number of people who would have been Witherspoon excludable had that line of 
questioning been reached, and it also means that death qualification eliminated a 
much larger percentage of the jurors who might otherwise have sat on the jury than 
indicated. 
Additionally, the data corroborate the theory that death-qualification proceedings 
have a larger impact upon the jury composition than the Witherspoon exclusions 
themselves. As noted above, death qualification can be used as a signaling function 
to capital attorneys about juror preferences that will lead them to strike death- or life-
averse jurors on peremptory grounds even if the attorneys’ for-cause challenges are 
unsuccessful. For example, in one trial, the state ultimately peremptorily struck three 
of the five jurors who were unsuccessfully challenged under Witherspoon;92 in 
another trial, two of three;93 and in another trial, two of two.94 Defense attorneys 
similarly struck jurors peremptorily who had expressed a pro-death attitude but about 
whom the judge had denied a for-cause challenge.95 In fact, it was much more com-
mon for judges to deny defense for-cause challenges under Morgan than to deny state
                                                                                                                 
 
grounds. Id. at 28 & n.98. If his estimate was correct, there was a strike rate of 6.6%; if not, 
the strike rate could have ranged from a low of 0% to a high of 8.2%. Whether the discrepancy 
between my results and his reflects evolving standards of decency is a question that could only 
be addressed with more data. 
 90. This exclusion rate occurred in the trial of Isaiah Doyle in Jefferson Parish.  
 91. The median percentage was 10.8%. 
 92. Trial of Jeffrey Clark. 
 93. Trial of Isaiah Doyle. 
 94. Trial of James Magee. 
 95. In the Robert Coleman trial, for example, nine Morgan challenges were denied, and 
the defense ultimately exercised peremptory strikes against six of these jurors. 
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for-cause challenges under Witherspoon—an average of 6.1 Morgan denials per trial 
versus an average of only 2.2 Witherspoon denials per trial. This discrepancy may 
reflect a number of different causes: the lesser persuasiveness of defense attorneys, 
the lesser willingness of judges to entertain defense motions, or the greater difficulty 
in satisfying the dictates of Morgan than the dictates of Witherspoon. In any event, 
the data show that, even aside from subsequent for-cause challenges on other 
grounds, a number of death- and life-averse jurors who were kept in the jury venire 
during death-qualification proceedings were nonetheless excluded from jury service 
through the exercise of peremptory challenges.99 
Even using the more conservative numbers I have supplied, which do not take 
into account the impact of additional peremptory challenges and other challenges for 
cause, the strike rates of conscientious objectors to the death penalty are substantial. 
On average, between one-fifth and one-quarter of these Louisiana venire members 
in capital cases where a death verdict was imposed were excluded from jury service 
on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty. The ensuing death verdicts were 
obtained only after removing this sizeable percentage of the community from the jury 
box. To call these verdicts representative of community acceptance of the death pen-
alty fundamentally mischaracterizes the community’s standards of decency and cre-
ates a deeply deceptive “objective indicator” for the Eighth Amendment analysis. 
2. Race and Witherspoon Strikes  
When the racial impact of the Witherspoon proceedings is analyzed, the picture 
becomes more troubling still. In my sample set, black venire members were excused 
on the basis of conscientious objections to the death penalty at a notably higher rate 
than their white counterparts. 
Four of the cases analyzed contained information on the record about the race of 
the venire members.100 Additionally, I was able to access information made available 
by the Louisiana Secretary of State concerning the demographics of registered voters 
in Caddo Parish in 2009 and 2013, and to compare the registered-voter lists to the 
jury lists in three additional Caddo Parish trials.101 Thus, I was able to collect 
individualized data on the race of all of the venire members for seven of the eleven 
trials. These seven trials involved the questioning of 803 potential jurors. 
The analysis of the race-based data is reported below in Tables 2 through 5.  
As reported in Table 2, across the seven cases for which juror-specific information 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. Similarly, Professor Winick found that prosecutors frequently struck death-averse ju-
rors who were not successfully challenged under Witherspoon. Winick, supra note 40, at 28 
(finding that “the prosecution used peremptory challenges . . . [to] eliminate[] 77% of the 
[remaining] scrupled jurors”). 
 100. The information was available for Isaiah Doyle (Jefferson Parish), as well as for Eric 
Mickelson, Lamondre Tucker, and Robert Coleman (all Caddo Parish). In Eric Mickelson’s 
trial, the race of fifteen of the 102 jurors (including three jurors struck for cause on 
Witherspoon grounds and three jurors struck for cause on Morgan grounds) inexplicably was 
not put on the record. The race of the remaining fifteen jurors was obtained through the Caddo 
Parish voter registration rolls.  
 101. Due to the prohibitive cost of obtaining data from more than one parish, I was unable 
to obtain similar demographic information for Bossier and St. Tammany Parishes. 
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on race was available, on average, 55.8% of the venire was white and 41.6% was 
black. In raw numbers, 460 out of 803 known-race venire members (or 57.3%) were 
white; 309 out of the 803 known-race venire members (or 38.5%) were black. 
Table 2. Black-White Composition of Jury Venires 
Trial Venire 
White Black Other 
Absolute 
Number 
% of 
Venire 
Absolute 
Number 
 % of 
Venire 
Absolute 
Number 
% of 
Venire 
Coleman 124 73 58.9% 50 40.3% 1 0.8% 
Crawford 83 48 57.8% 35 42.2% 0 0.0% 
Dorsey 91 51 56.0% 39 42.9% 1 1.1% 
Doyle 224 146 65.2% 54 24.1% 24 10.7% 
Mickelson 102 47 46.1% 53 52.0% 2 2.0% 
Reed 84 46 54.8% 38 45.2% 0 0.0% 
Tucker 95 49 51.6% 42 44.2% 4 4.2% 
 Average 114.7 65.7 55.8% 44.1 41.6% 4.6 2.7% 
 Median  95 49 56.0% 42 42.2% 1 1.1% 
Standard Deviation 50.2 36.6 6.0% 7.8 8.5% 8.7 3.8% 
 Sum Total 803 460 57.3%102 311 38.7%103 32 4.0% 
As reported in Table 3, black jurors were struck under Witherspoon at markedly 
higher rates than white jurors. In the seven cases for which individualized infor-
mation on race was available, of all the jurors struck on the grounds of their objec-
tions to the death penalty, an average of 38.7% were white, while 59.8% were 
black.104 However, the venires were, on average, 55.8% white and 41.6% black.  
The racially disparate Witherspoon strike rate had a marked impact upon the racial 
composition of the remaining jury pool. On average, fully 35.2%—more than one-
third—of the black potential jurors in the venire were excluded on the basis of their 
opposition to the death penalty. By contrast, only 17.0% of the total white jury pool 
was struck. If one looks holistically across trials, 112 out of the 311 black venire 
members were excluded (an average of 36.0%), while 92 out of 460 white venire 
members were excluded (an average of 20.0%). Consequently, black jurors were 1.8 
times more likely to be struck under Witherspoon than white jurors. 
The one exception to the pattern of disproportionate Witherspoon strikes of black 
as opposed to white prospective jurors was the voir dire in Isaiah Doyle’s trial, which 
took place in Jefferson Parish. Although the Witherspoon strike rate for black jurors 
was roughly consistent with the strike rate of the trials in Caddo Parish (37.0% of the 
black members of the jury venire were struck for cause on Witherspoon grounds, 
compared to an average of 34.9% in the other six Caddo trials), the Witherspoon 
strike rate for whites was much higher than in the Caddo Parish trials (32.2% of the 
white members of the jury venire were struck for cause on Witherspoon grounds, 
compared to an average of 14.5% in the six Caddo trials). Thus, in the Doyle trial, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. This number represents the overall percentage of white venire members among the 
803 known-race venire members. 
 103. This number represents the overall percentage of black venire members among the 
803 known-race venire members. 
 104. This average was compiled by taking an average of the total percentage for each case. 
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the strike rates of blacks and whites were roughly similar to their proportion of the 
jury venire, with a slightly higher rate of exclusion for black jurors. The overall im-
pact was a considerably higher total strike rate for this trial than the others: fully 
32.1% of the venire was excluded on account of conscientious objections to the death 
penalty, the highest exclusion rate of any trial in the study. 
The overall findings of a disproportionate rate of exclusion of black venire 
members corroborate scholarship hypothesizing that death-qualification proceedings 
have a “whitewashing” effect, stripping the jury venire of many otherwise qualified 
minority jurors and further reducing minority participation on capital juries.105 The 
significance of this “whitewashing” must be assessed not only in its impact upon the 
outcomes of individual cases106 but also in its impact upon the Eighth Amendment 
inquiry into “evolving standards of decency.” When black venire members are dis-
proportionately removed from capital juries, they are removed from the conversation 
about the constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. The 
“evolving standards of decency” that the Court is considering are standards attributa-
ble to a whiter and less diverse population than would be the case without death 
qualification. 
It is worth noting that, as reported in Table 4, the Morgan disqualifications had 
an opposite racial impact than the Witherspoon disqualifications, striking substan-
tially more white jurors than black. On average across the cases with individualized 
race data, the Morgan-struck jurors were 68.6% white and 26.3% black. Only 22 
black jurors were struck under Morgan, compared to 112 black jurors struck under 
Witherspoon. An average of 12.7% of all the white venire members were struck un-
der Morgan, while an average of only 6.8% black venire members were struck under 
Morgan. 
As reported in Table 5, the ultimate racial composition of the jury venire changed 
through the process of death qualification. Across the eleven trials, the venire started 
out, on average, 55.8% white and 41.6% black. Once all jurors excluded under 
Witherspoon were removed from the jury venire, however, the remaining pool was, 
on average, 61.3% white and 35.5% black. Morgan strikes slightly reduced the 
racially disparate impact of Witherspoon on the jury venire: leaving aside all jurors 
excluded during death qualification under both Witherspoon and Morgan, the 
remaining venire was, on average, 60.0% white and 37.1% black. Still, the jury 
venire after death qualification proceedings was comprised of a higher percentage of 
whites and a lower percentage of blacks than the original demographic makeup.  
These numbers can also be understood in terms of the ratio of black to white 
jurors. On average, for every black juror in the original venire, there were 1.3 white 
jurors. For every black juror that survived Witherspoon strikes, there were 1.7 white 
jurors that survived Witherspoon strikes. For every black juror remaining after both 
Witherspoon and Morgan strikes, there were 1.6 white jurors. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See supra note 44. 
 106. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing 
in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial 
Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 193 (2001) (finding that “[t]he presence of five or 
more white males on the jury dramatically increased the likelihood of a death sentence in the 
B/W cases” and that “[t]he presence of black male jurors in these B/W cases, by contrast, 
substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sentence”). 
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Table 5. Racial Composition of Venire Before and After Death Qualification 
Trial 
Venire (Before 
Witherspoon and 
Morgan strikes) 
Remaining Venire 
After Excluding 
Jurors Under 
Witherspoon 
Remaining Venire 
After Excluding 
Jurors Under Both 
Witherspoon and 
Morgan 
% White % Black % White % Black % White % Black 
Coleman 58.9% 40.3% 66.7% 32.3% 63.5% 35.1% 
Crawford 57.8% 42.2% 60.3% 39.7% 59.4% 40.6% 
Dorsey 56.0% 42.9% 63.6% 34.8% 62.1% 37.9% 
Doyle 65.2% 24.1% 65.1% 22.4% 61.4% 26.3% 
Mickelson 46.1% 52.0% 55.4% 41.9% 56.3% 40.6% 
Reed 54.8% 45.2% 56.9% 43.1% 55.7% 44.3% 
Tucker 51.6% 44.2% 61.2% 34.3% 61.4% 35.1% 
Average 55.8% 41.6% 61.3% 35.5% 60.0% 37.1% 
Median 56.0% 42.9% 61.2% 34.8% 61.4% 37.9% 
Standard Deviation 6.0% 8.5% 4.2% 7.1% 3.0% 5.8% 
3. Data Significance and Limitations 
The data analysis above bears immediate and potent significance. It shows that, 
in the sample set of Louisiana cases, a sizeable number of people were removed from 
jury service for cause due to their conscientious objections to the death penalty. It 
provides strong evidence that death verdicts would be unattainable without death 
qualification and that the number of death verdicts obtained in practice does not pre-
sent a complete or accurate portrait of death penalty support within the community. 
Finally, it provides support for the argument that death qualification bears a dis-
proportionate impact upon black venire members. 
Of course, there are methodological limitations to the data that make it difficult 
to accurately extrapolate these findings to the nation as a whole. The sampled cases 
represent more than three-quarters of the capital cases resulting in a death verdict in 
Louisiana over a five-year period and encompasses individualized data about 1445 
potential jurors, but it is not a representative sample of cases and jurors nationwide.107 
Moreover, I have collected data only about cases that resulted in a death verdict. 
While I see this data set as the most important indicator of the degree of distortion of 
the “objective indicator” of capital jury verdicts, data on the strike rates in cases 
resulting in life verdicts would also be telling about the degree of opposition to the 
death penalty in various localities. 
Moreover, Louisiana has unique features that may make it unrepresentative of 
other states. For example, it has a large black population,108 concentrated especially 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. From 2009 to 2013, there were 482 death sentences imposed nationwide. Death 
Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
(2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 [https://perma.cc 
/9GQ9-LADC].  
 108. According to U.S. census data, in 2013, Louisiana was 32.4% black, while the na-
tional average was 13.2%. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population 
by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States, States, and Counties: April 1, 2010 
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heavily in Caddo Parish,109 where six of the eleven cases were prosecuted; it has a 
large Catholic community,110 which may be particularly opposed to the death pen-
alty;111 and there is an acute distrust of police112 and the criminal-justice system113 in 
certain regions, particularly amongst African Americans.  
At the same time, much of Louisiana’s population is deeply conservative,114 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
to July 1, 2013, AM. FACTFINDER (June 2014), http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP 
/2013/PEPSR6H/0100000US|0400000US22?slice=Year~est72013 [https://perma.cc/U6HA 
-DL3C?type=image]. 
 109. In 2014, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that 121,781 out of 252,603 Caddo Parish 
residents (or 48.2%) were black. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident 
Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States, States, and Counties: 
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014, AM. FACTFINDER (June 2015), http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk 
/table/1.0/en/PEP/2014/PEPSR6H/0500000US22017?slice=Year~est72014 [https://perma.cc 
/SST9-TFHB?type=image]. 
 110. In 2010, Louisiana was reported to be 26% Catholic, the tenth most Catholic state per 
capita and the Southern state with the highest per capita Catholic population. Ass’n of 
Statisticians of Am. Religious Bodies, U.S. RELIGION CENSUS, 1952 TO 2010, 
http://rcms2010.org/compare.php [https://web.archive.org/web/20160401063321/http://www 
.rcms2010.org/compare.php] (under “By Individual Religious Group,” select “2010,” “State,” 
and “Catholic Church”). 
 111. See The Church’s Anti-Death Penalty Position, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (2016), 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/death-penalty-capital-punishment 
/catholic-campaign-to-end-the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm [https://perma.cc/M3E8-K3QH]. 
 112. See, e.g., Jarvis DeBerry, Crime Fight Crippled by Distrust of New Orleans Police 
Department, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 11, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/opinions 
/index.ssf/2012/03/crime_fight_crippled_by_distru.html [https://perma.cc/JR8V-G2MP]; 
Letter from Mitch Landrieu, Mayor of New Orleans, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 
(May 5, 2010), http://media.nola.com/crime_impact/other/LettertoAttyGenHolder.050510.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QGC5-PZUK] (inviting the Department of Justice to investigate the New 
Orleans Police Department and partner with the city in generating reform). 
 113. The Caddo Parish District Attorney’s office, for example, has recently been the focus 
of scrutiny for its racially disparate exercise of peremptory strikes. URSULA NOYE, REPRIEVE 
AUSTL., BLACKSTRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES BY THE CADDO PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2015), https:// 
blackstrikes.com/resources/Blackstrikes_Caddo_Parish_August_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/WAQ6-MWJP]; Adam Liptak, Exclusion of Blacks from Juries Raises Renewed Scrutiny, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/exclusion-of 
-blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/2BBZ-67MR]. In recent 
years, the Parish also came under fire for continuing to fly a Confederate flag outside the 
courthouse; the flag was taken down in 2011. Caddo Parish Officials Vote To Remove 
Confederate Flag, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 3, 2011, 10:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics 
/index.ssf/2011/11/caddo_parish_officials_vote_to.html [https://perma.cc/Z6RT-CLHP]. 
There is continuing debate over whether to remove a Confederate monument from outside the 
courthouse doors. Sara Machi, Shreveport NAACP Calls for Removal of Confederate 
Monument from Caddo Courthouse, KTBS (Jun. 24, 2015, 9:07 PM), http://www.ktbs.com 
/story/29402444/shreveport-naacp-calls-for-removal-of-confederate-monument-from-caddo 
-courthouse [https://perma.cc/4BYT-TMUV]. 
 114. Frank Newport, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana Most Conservative States, 
GALLUP (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181505/mississippi-alabama-louisiana 
-conservative-states.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/20160506135202/http://www.gallup.com 
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there is a strong punitive, law-and-order culture that has led to the highest incarcera-
tion rate in the nation.115 Louisiana is far from the liberal stronghold of 
Massachusetts, where Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was sentenced to death in spite of wide-
spread community sentiment against the death penalty. Caddo Parish, where six of 
these eleven cases were prosecuted, produced the highest per capita rate of death 
sentences of any county with four or more death sentences between 2010 and 2014.116 
Louisiana falls roughly in the middle of death-penalty states in terms of its per capita 
rate of death sentences between 1977 and 2013 with the twelfth-highest rate of death 
sentences over this time period, coming in just behind Texas.117 Thus, Louisiana has 
some features that make it representative of death-penalty states nationwide, and 
some features that may make it somewhat aberrational. 
Aside from any idiosyncrasies in the data that may arise from the focus on 
Louisiana cases, there are a multitude of factors influencing the rate of Witherspoon 
strikes in any particular case that limit the predictive value of any single trial. The 
number of Witherspoon strikes varies considerably depending on the prosecutor’s 
ardor or tenacity in pursuing Witherspoon challenges, the defense attorney’s skill at 
rehabilitating challenged jurors, the judge’s individual receptiveness to Witherspoon 
challenges, the manner in which the voir dire questioning is conducted (by the judge, 
by the attorneys, with the assistance of questionnaires, through individualized 
questioning outside the presence of other jurors, and so forth), and many other fac-
tors. Even within my sample of cases, and within the same exact parish, there were 
some notable differences between Witherspoon strike rates across cases. Rodricus 
Crawford’s case, for example, was an apparent outlier with 12.0% of the jury venire 
                                                                                                                 
 
/poll/181505/mississippi-alabama-louisiana-conservative-states.aspx]. More recent polling 
ranks Louisiana as the eighth-most conservative state. Jeffrey M. Jones, Red States Outnumber 
Blue for First Time in Gallup Tracking, GALLUP (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll 
/188969/red-states-outnumber-blue-first-time-gallup-tracking.aspx [https://web.archive.org 
/web/20161104040828/http://www.gallup.com/poll/188969/red-states-outnumber-blue-first 
-time-gallup-tracking.aspx]. 
 115. LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248479, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 11 
(2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KWD-YYHD] 
(reporting that Louisiana incarcerates 1420 individuals per 100,000 adults, whereas Maine, by 
contrast, incarcerates 350 individuals per 100,000 adults). 
 116. Campbell Robertson, The Prosecutor Who Says Louisiana Should ‘Kill More People,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/louisiana-prosecutor 
-becomes-blunt-spokesman-for-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/JE46-WMT4] (“Caddo 
Parish, here in the northwestern corner of the state, is one of these counties. Within Louisiana, 
where capital punishment has declined steeply, Caddo has become an outlier, accounting for 
fewer than 5 percent of the state’s death sentences in the early 1980s but nearly half over the 
past five years. Even on a national level Caddo stands apart. From 2010 to 2014, more people 
were sentenced to death per capita here than in any other county in the United States, among 
counties with four or more death sentences in that time period.”). 
 117. Death Sentences Per Capita by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-capita-state [https://perma.cc/GUE4-HS7R] 
(listing Louisiana as issuing 0.355 death sentences per 10,000 people and listing Texas as 
issuing 0.380 death sentences per 10,000 people). 
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struck on Witherspoon grounds, while in the other five Caddo Parish cases, the strike 
rate ranged from 22.6% to 29.5%.  
In light of these methodological constraints, the goal of this study is not to capture 
a complete picture of the impact of death qualification on capital trials in the United 
States as a whole. Indeed, these limitations point to the urgent need for additional 
study of the practice of death qualification and for systematic, widespread collection 
of data on strike rates to more accurately gauge Witherspoon’s impact.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the findings presented above are sub-
stantial enough that they warrant immediate judicial recognition of the constitution-
ally cognizable role that death qualification plays in influencing the outcomes of 
capital jury trials and demand judicial consideration of Witherspoon exclusions in 
evaluating the nation’s evolving standards of decency on the death penalty. 
Without the Witherspoon data reported above, a court considering the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty would observe that, over a five-year span, Louisiana 
saw twenty-seven capital trials, fourteen of which—nearly half—resulted in a death 
verdict. Although certainly not overwhelming evidence that the death penalty was 
broadly accepted within the state, a court could interpret this data to reflect that the 
death penalty was not wholly out of keeping with the community’s “evolving stand-
ards of decency.” Yet the findings reported above should make us deeply skeptical 
of any such conclusion. The eleven death verdicts studied here were obtained only 
by striking one out of every four to five prospective jurors due to their fundamental 
opposition to the death penalty. The death verdicts were obtained by striking more 
than one of every three prospective black jurors for that same reason. And, due to 
the requirement that a death verdict be unanimous, if any single Witherspoon-
excluded juror had made it into the jury box in any of these trials, the result could 
have been different. It is likely that few of these death verdicts—if any—would have 
been sustained absent the practice of death qualification. Thus, when integrating 
Witherspoon strike data alongside the number of death verdicts as “objective indicia” 
of “evolving standards of decency,” community values look dramatically different, 
and the constitutionality of the death penalty is cast in grave doubt.  
III. FINDING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S LOST JURORS 
In this Part, I offer concrete suggestions for how the Court should account for 
Witherspoon strike rates in a more refined way over time. First, beginning now, the 
Court should explicitly consider the practice of death qualification and, to the extent 
available, Witherspoon strike rates in its Eighth Amendment analysis. Second, death 
penalty states should mandate and systematize the collection of data about these 
strikes so that information is available for judicial analysis going forward.  
A. Operationalizing the “Objective Indicator” 
Already, courts considering the constitutionality of the death penalty have enough 
information to begin considering Witherspoon strikes as “objective indicia” of 
“evolving standards of decency.” The persistence of the practice of death qualifica-
tion and the initial findings presented in the study above provide ample basis for 
questioning whether death verdicts truly represent community endorsement of the 
death penalty. If the Supreme Court acts quickly and takes up Justice Breyer’s call 
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to reconsider the constitutionality of the death penalty, it should account for existing 
evidence of the impact of death qualification in its Eighth Amendment analysis.  
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a precise formula to follow in 
accounting for Witherspoon strikes; “evolving standards of decency” have always 
been understood in the gestalt, and there is no existing rigid method for determining 
whether a particular punishment practice violates the Eighth Amendment. While the 
Court has stated clearly the types of objective indicators it looks to,118 it has not 
enumerated how heavily each indicator should weigh or what the tipping point might 
be between a constitutional or unconstitutional practice. With respect to legislative 
trends, for example, in recent years, the Court has looked to the absolute number 
and/or the percentage of states adopting a particular practice119 and to the direction 
or consistency of change in rejecting or adopting the practice120—or both. With re-
spect to jury sentencing practices, the Court has similarly looked to the frequency 
and/or proportion of jury verdicts of death in a particular type of case and roughly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 119. Id. at 334 (“In our view, the two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally 
retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, 
do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus.”); Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (“Today, no State in the Union permits the execution of the insane.”); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1982) (“Thus only a small minority of jurisdic-
tions—eight—allow the death penalty to be imposed solely because the defendant somehow 
participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was committed. . . . Moreover, of 
the eight States which have enacted new death penalty statutes since 1978, none authorize 
capital punishment in such circumstances. While the current legislative judgment with respect 
to imposition of the death penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take it, or 
intend to take life is neither ‘wholly unanimous among state legislatures’ nor as compelling as 
the legislative judgments considered in Coker, it nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting 
capital punishment for the crime at issue.” (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion)); Coker, 433 U.S. at 594 (plurality opin-
ion) (“Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death 
penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes [post-Furman].”). 
 120. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014) (“These aggregate numbers are not the 
only considerations bearing on a determination of consensus. Consistency of the direction of 
change is also relevant.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005) (“The number of 
States that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile offenders since Stanford is smaller 
than the number of States that abandoned capital punishment for the mentally retarded after 
Penry; yet we think the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated. . . . 
Any difference between this case and Atkins with respect to the pace of abolition is thus 
counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16 (“It 
is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction 
of change. Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than 
legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States 
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States 
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful 
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpa-
ble than the average criminal.”). 
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estimated whether this tally supports or weighs against the comportment of the 
sentencing practice at issue with “evolving standards of decency.”121 
Similarly, in tallying the prevalence and significance of Witherspoon dis-
qualifications when precise figures are available, courts should consider both (1) the 
absolute number and/or percentage of Witherspoon-excluded venire members and 
(2) the trend in the rate of disqualification over time. These numbers should serve as 
a counter to the absolute number of jury verdicts of death. Thus, for example, Justice 
Breyer, dissenting in Glossip, argued that the death penalty had become unusual, due 
in part to the fifteen-year decline in death sentences from an average of 286 per year 
between 1986 and 1999 to a total of seventy-three in 2014.122 Even this description 
of the sharp decline in death verdicts may vastly overrepresent community 
willingness to impose the penalty of death. A more accurate gauge of the death pen-
alty’s unusualness would be to put this number side by side with data about the 
percentage of jurors struck for cause and the rate of change in Witherspoon strikes. 
The side-by-side data could be aggregate—that is, a total number or percentage of 
death verdicts alongside a total percentage of jurors struck in all capital cases or in 
those capital cases resulting in a death verdict. Or the side-by-side data could, more 
meaningfully, though more labor-intensively, be tailored to individual cases. In those 
seventy-three death verdicts, either as a whole or individually, how many potential 
jurors were struck for cause? How much smaller might the tally of death verdicts be 
if there were no conscience-based restrictions on capital jury service? In assessing 
the practical impact of death qualification, it is necessary to realize that if any single 
true conscientious objector had made it onto the jury, because of the unanimity 
requirement, the end result would be a life verdict. A relatively low rate of 
Witherspoon exclusions could thus still have a profound impact on the outcomes of 
capital trials nationwide.  
When precise figures on Witherspoon rates are unavailable, the phenomenon of 
death qualification should serve as a kind of asterisk to the tally of death verdicts 
—an important caveat to its representativeness of community values. 
There are, of course, a few notes of caution in incorporating Witherspoon strike 
rates into the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry. It is worth reiterating that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion) (“[I]n the vast majority of cases, at least 9 
out of 10, juries have not imposed the death sentence [for the crime of rape].”); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he actions of juries in many States 
since Furman are fully compatible with the legislative judgments, reflected in the new statutes, 
as to the continued utility and necessity of capital punishment in appropriate cases. At the 
close of 1974 at least 254 persons had been sentenced to death since Furman, and by the end 
of March 1976, more than 460 persons were subject to death sentences.”). 
 122. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772–73 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An 
appropriate starting point concerns the trajectory of the number of annual death sentences 
nationwide, from the 1970’s to present day. In 1977—just after the Supreme Court made clear 
that, by modifying their legislation, States could reinstate the death penalty—137 people were 
sentenced to death. Many States having revised their death penalty laws to meet Furman’s 
requirements, the number of death sentences then increased. Between 1986 and 1999, 286 
persons on average were sentenced to death each year. But, approximately 15 years ago, the 
numbers began to decline, and they have declined rapidly ever since. In 1999, 279 persons 
were sentenced to death. Last year, just 73 persons were sentenced to death.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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tally of Witherspoon exclusions is not an independently accurate measure of nation-
wide anti-death-penalty sentiment, and it should not be misused as such. By defini-
tion, death-qualification proceedings only occur in those limited jurisdictions in 
which prosecutors are authorized by law and willing in fact to seek the death penalty, 
and we certainly may expect that the number of death-penalty opponents in these 
jurisdictions is substantially lower than the number of death-penalty opponents in 
other jurisdictions where the death penalty is legally or functionally obsolete.  
In fact, one might say that there is an upper limit on the Witherspoon strike rate. 
As more and more people in a particular jurisdiction become Witherspoon excluda-
ble, at a certain tipping point the elected prosecutor in that jurisdiction will presuma-
bly stop seeking death. Thus the rate of Witherspoon excludables might actually de-
crease over time even if there is growing opposition to the death penalty, because 
the death cases become concentrated in the most pro-death jurisdictions.123 Still, even 
in the most pro-death jurisdictions in the most pro-death states, the state will need to 
exclude people on the basis of their beliefs in order to secure convictions. And those 
convictions would otherwise be counted solely as indicators that the nation as a whole 
is not opposed to the death penalty. 
The courts should also be aware that the tally of Witherspoon strikes does not 
capture those peremptory challenges of individuals who are not subject to successful 
for-cause challenges but nevertheless express reservations about the death penalty 
and thus get removed from juries. This tally also does not include hardship excusals, 
which remove from capital juries individuals for whom service in a protracted trial, 
frequently while sequestered, would pose undue difficulties. Hardship excusals may 
have a disparate racial impact, to the extent that race correlates with factors that boost 
the likelihood of an excusal, such as household wealth,124 single parenthood,125 and 
employment characteristics (such as an hourly-wage employee whose employer re-
fuses to provide paid jury leave). If African Americans are both more death-averse, 
as suggested by the data collected in the present study, and more likely to be excused 
for hardship, then hardship excusals may exacerbate the impact of death qualification 
in producing juries that are more death prone than the communities from which they 
are drawn.126 
Even noting these cautionary words, inserting the rate—or even an informed 
estimate—of Witherspoon strikes into the constitutional analysis reincorporates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Presumably, however, when this occurs, the number of death verdicts will also 
decrease. 
 124. In 2013, the median net worth of white households was thirteen times greater than 
that of black households. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened 
Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACT TANK 
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great 
-recession/ [https://perma.cc/Q43C-T26R]. 
 125. According to U.S. Census data, 39.9% of African American parents living with their 
children under eighteen are single parents, compared to only 12.9% of white parents. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE A3. PARENTS WITH CORESIDENT CHILDREN UNDER 18, BY LIVING 
ARRANGEMENT, SEX, AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2015, http://www.census.gov 
/hhes/families/files/cps2015/tabA3.xls [https://perma.cc/32LW-HDDL]. 
 126. The impact of hardship excusals on the composition and disposition of capital juries 
is an area of scholarly inquiry deserving future consideration. 
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critical dissenting voices into the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry and 
recovers a more accurate picture of community willingness to sentence individuals 
to death.  
B. Collecting Data 
The more data before the Court on Witherspoon strike rates nationwide, the more 
precise its consideration will be of the impact of death qualification in its “evolving 
standards of decency” inquiry. This Article has taken a first step by explicitly count-
ing every Witherspoon strike in eleven recent capital trials.127 I hope that this effort 
of retroactive data collection will continue, either through my own initiative or by 
others. Yet the labor-intensiveness and methodological limitations of the data collec-
tion process constrains its feasibility for active use in litigation and points to the need 
for a forward-looking, ongoing data-collection process.128  
In recognition of the practical difficulties of achieving a full accounting of the 
historical impact of Witherspoon strikes, I offer a relatively simple data collection 
strategy for future trials. I propose that legislatures or courts adopt a forward-looking 
statute or court rule that would look something like this: 
Reporting on death qualification proceedings. 
1. In every capital case,129 the court reporter shall 
(a)  record the number of potential jurors struck for cause on the basis 
of their opposition to the death penalty;  
(b)  record the total number of potential jurors questioned; and 
(c)  include these numbers in the transcript of the trial, to be pre-
served in the record on appeal. 
2. In every capital case, the trial court shall report the statistics rec-
orded by the court reporter to the state supreme court [or legislature 
or other centralized body]. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Future articles may continue this project of aggregating and analyzing past data on 
Witherspoon strike rates. 
 128. Capital-jury voir dire transcripts are difficult and often expensive to obtain. They are 
multiple volumes long and take hours to process. My study of eleven capital trials consumed 
several hundred hours of data collection, analysis, and processing. Over the same five-year 
period that I focused on in my study, there were 482 death sentences imposed nationwide. 
Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra note 107. Between 
2000 and 2014, there were 1879 death sentences imposed. Death Sentences by Year Since 
1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-year 
-1977-2009 [https://perma.cc/8RNN-ER6B]. Massive time, expense, and human effort would 
be required to fully capture the impact of Witherspoon nationwide—although some of this 
effort could be reduced by taking a national sample of cases resulting in a death verdict, rather 
than reviewing every case resulting in a death verdict. 
 129. One could imagine a variation on this rule that would require collection of data only 
in cases where a death verdict was reached, for the reasons articulated supra p. 131. 
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3. The state supreme court [or legislature or other centralized body] 
shall maintain and provide meaningful public access to these 
statistics. 
The prosecuting attorney and defense attorney shall have the opportunity 
to review the statistics recorded. If the number is contested by either 
party, the court shall make a determination of the accurate tally.130 
The benefits of such a rule are readily apparent. Most practically, requiring 
ongoing collection of death-qualification data would have a profound impact on the 
ability of courts and advocates to account for Witherspoon strikes in assessing 
whether the death penalty offends contemporary standards of decency. 
Such a requirement would also have an important effect in affirming the 
participatory ethos of the Eighth Amendment, discussed at greater length below. Ra-
ther than silencing the voices of conscientious objectors in the constitutional 
conversation about permissible punishment, this requirement would affirm the valid-
ity and relevance of these voices in the national debate. Imagine the difference 
between these two conversations between a court and a struck juror: 
COURT today: You are struck for cause because you cannot follow the 
law. 
COURT in the future: You are struck for cause because of your strong 
views against the death penalty. However, your objections have been 
noted and will be included in the official record of the case. 
This court rule would not unduly burden attorneys, judges, or court personnel, nor 
would it create a substantive change in the law that would spark serious controversy. 
It would impose a relatively minor contemporaneous-reporting requirement in a con-
text in which court actors are already reviewing the trial record, lodging transcripts, 
and preparing for appeal.  
Inevitably, there will also be some burden placed on the capital-defense 
community—or perhaps on scholars—to aggregate the data and make it useable and 
useful to a court. Critically, however, this information would be accessible for com-
mon use. 
IV. RECLAIMING THE PARTICIPATORY EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
As explained above, accounting for the impact of death qualification would 
further an important practical goal by capturing a more accurate snapshot of society’s 
“evolving standards of decency” on the death penalty. I turn now to consider how 
this project serves the broader participatory function of the Eighth Amendment itself.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. The missing piece from the above model rule is one that I find to be of critical im-
portance: a tally of the racial makeup of the group of excluded prospective jurors. I leave this 
out from the model rule because I anticipate that it would garner significant opposition that 
may, in some cases, derail the overall project of collecting data on Witherspoon strikes. Some 
jurisdictions refuse to collect data on the racial makeup of jury venires. However, where politi-
cally feasible, I would recommend the inclusion of information about the racial composition 
of the jury venire and the racial composition of those struck under Witherspoon. 
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is one of the few significant contexts in which 
the courts at least profess131 to engage in a back-and-forth conversation with the 
populace to determine the scope of constitutional protections. While popular 
constitutionalists look for and value a dynamic constitutional conversation between 
the people and the courts to explain the evolution of all areas of constitutional law,132 
the Eighth Amendment conversation is more direct and deliberate. Silencing voices 
of death penalty opponents is thus particularly dangerous to the larger Eighth 
Amendment project. 
Because of the focus on “evolving standards of decency,” the Court in the Eighth 
Amendment context explicitly looks outward to the people to determine the scope of 
constitutional protections. The voice of the citizenry therefore has a critical role in 
delimiting the scope of the constitutional guarantee. For instance, after the Court 
ruled in Furman v. Georgia133 that the death penalty was unconstitutional as pres-
ently administered, the strong legislative response reenacting reformed death penalty 
statutes reaffirmed for the Court that there was no consensus that the death penalty 
was “cruel and unusual.”134 And when the Court struck down the practices of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Some have argued that the Court’s inquiry into “objective indicia” of “evolving stand-
ards of decency” merely provides cover for the Court to reach its own desired conclusion. See, 
e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Beyond the empty 
talk of a ‘national consensus,’ the Court gives us a brief glimpse of what really underlies to-
day’s decision: pretension to a power confined neither by the moral sentiments originally en-
shrined in the Eighth Amendment (its original meaning) nor even by the current moral senti-
ments of the American people. ‘“[T]he Constitution,” the Court says, “contemplates that in 
the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the 
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”’ . . . The arrogance of this assumption of power 
takes one’s breath away. And it explains, of course, why the Court can be so cavalier about 
the evidence of consensus. It is just a game, after all.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 312 (majority opinion))); Stinneford, supra note 56, at 1757 (“The only real differ-
ence between [Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Roper] lies not in any ‘evolu-
tion’ of societal standards, but in an increased assertiveness of judicial will. The Roper major-
ity wanted to strike down the death penalty for seventeen-year-olds, despite the fact that the 
evidence did not demonstrate that such executions violated any societal moral consensus, at 
least within the United States, and so it simply pretended that the evidence supported the de-
sired result.” (emphasis in original)). Corinna Barrett Lain has argued with nuance that the 
Court’s death-penalty decisions are constrained not by a majoritarian Eighth Amendment doc-
trine—which in practice the members of the Court remain free to, and in fact do, sidestep at 
will—but by the “[n]ondoctrinal majoritarian forces” that operate on the Justices as well as 
other members of society and influence what outcomes they desire to reach. Corinna Barrett 
Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–6 (2007). 
 132. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 379 (2007). 
 133. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 134. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Despite the 
continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility of capital 
punishment, it is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard 
it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. The most marked indication of society’s 
endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The legisla-
tures of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at 
least some crimes that result in the death of another person. And the Congress of the United 
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executing intellectually disabled135 and juvenile136 offenders, it did so without 
overruling its earlier, opposite conclusions in recent precedent.137 Instead, by 
listening to the voices of the citizenry—by looking outward to indicators of society’s 
views of “cruel and unusual punishments” (as well as inward to their own 
independent judgment as Justices)—the members of the Court concluded that the 
ambit of the substantive constitutional protection had changed.138 If the national 
constitutional conversation can alter the shape of constitutional rights under the 
Eighth Amendment, then it is critical to consider whether and to what extent different 
members of the polity can participate in that conversation.139  
                                                                                                                 
 
States, in 1974, enacted a statute providing the death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in 
death. . . . [A]ll of the post-Furman statutes make clear that capital punishment itself has not 
been rejected by the elected representatives of the people.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 135. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002). 
 136. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005). 
 137. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (upholding the execution of juve-
nile offenders); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (upholding the execution of men-
tally retarded offenders). 
 138. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (“Three Terms ago the subject [of execution of mentally re-
tarded offenders] was reconsidered in Atkins. We held that standards of decency have evolved 
since Penry and now demonstrate that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and un-
usual punishment. The Court noted objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in 
legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions of the mentally retarded. 
When Atkins was decided only a minority of States permitted the practice, and even in those 
States it was rare. On the basis of these indicia the Court determined that executing mentally 
retarded offenders ‘has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has 
developed against it.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316)); Stinneford, supra 
note 56, at 1741 (“In Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court appeared 
to agree that the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded and on seventeen-
year-olds respectively was not cruel and unusual punishment in 1989, when Penry v. Lynaugh 
and Stanford v. Kentucky were decided. Nonetheless, the Court held that such punishments 
are cruel and unusual today. As Justice Scalia stated in his Roper dissent, the decisions in 
Atkins and Roper are based on the proposition ‘that the meaning of our Constitution has 
changed over the past 15 years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was 
wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.’” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); see also Aliza Cover, Cruel and 
Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the Counter-Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1141, 1174 (2014). 
 139. In this paper, I focus solely on the participatory dynamics of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In future works, it would be worthwhile to explore the participatory dynamics 
of other constitutional provisions, as well. In particular, there are a number of constitutional 
protections whose scope is determined on the basis of community or contemporary values. To 
name a few: First Amendment jurisprudence incorporates community standards for determin-
ing obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (considering “whether 
‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest” (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 
230 (1972) (per curiam)); Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seeks to articulate “reasonable” 
expectations of privacy in a changing world, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); and Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process 
analysis looks outward to evolving cultural norms in identifying protected liberties, see, e.g., 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in 
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The Court’s inclusion of jury verdicts in the Eighth Amendment analysis 
incorporates the voices of individual citizens—not only the People’s representa-
tives—on the cruelty of punishment.140 Twelve citizens whose primary role is to 
make a decision about life or death for a particular criminal defendant are also 
participating in the constitutional conversation about the permissibility of the death 
penalty. They “speak” through their verdicts about the constitutionality of imposing 
the punishment of death, and the Court listens. 
But capital jurors—both those selected for service and those excused—speak in 
other meaningful ways besides through their votes in the jury room. In particular, 
Witherspoon proceedings dramatically invite a constitutional conversation. Death 
qualification occurs at the intersection of two inherently dialogic phenomena: (a) the 
Eighth Amendment inquiry into “evolving standards of decency” described above 
and (b) jury voir dire proceedings (and, even more specifically, capital jury voir dire 
proceedings). Because both the prosecution and defense are motivated to elicit ju-
rors’ moral viewpoints on the death penalty, Witherspoon proceedings become for-
mal, in-court conversations about the community’s “evolving standards of decency.” 
Death qualification is thus a unique and powerful moment of dramatized dialogue 
between judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors about whether the death 
penalty is an acceptable punishment, either in particular contexts or as a general mat-
ter. Ordinary citizens—some of whom have never had occasion to confront the issue 
before—are asked to voice their opinions in a court of law about the morality of 
capital punishment. Setting aside for a moment the debate about the relative merits 
or injustice of death qualification for individual capital defendants, this is a 
                                                                                                                 
 
the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness 
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their pri-
vate lives in matters pertaining to sex. ‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in 
all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’” (quoting City of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring))); id. at 578–79 (“[T]hose who 
drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses . . . knew times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.”). What rights do citizens have to participate in the na-
tional conversations that determine the scope of these rights?  
Often judges debate whether the courts are accurately deciphering community values—or 
whether they ever can or should, in light of institutional incompetence relative to legislatures. 
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749–50 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Capital 
punishment presents moral questions that philosophers, theologians, and statesmen have grap-
pled with for millennia. The Framers of our Constitution disagreed bitterly on the matter. For 
that reason, they handled it the same way they handled many other controversial issues: they 
left it to the People to decide. By arrogating to himself the power to overturn that decision, 
Justice BREYER does not just reject the death penalty, he rejects the Enlightenment.”). But 
there is less focus on the systemic legal features that enhance or restrict individual participation 
in those determinations, if judges are to engage in them. Too often the Court accepts at face 
value the participatory bona fides of the official institutions to which they turn.  
 140. Note that the two key objective indicators—capital jury verdicts and legislative 
determinations—incorporate both the People, directly, and their representatives into the 
Eighth Amendment analysis. 
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remarkable opportunity for genuine citizen engagement on the question of “evolving 
standards of decency.”141 
In transcripts reviewed for the Louisiana study, objections voiced to the death 
penalty ranged from the immorality of state killing to its lack of deterrent value. 
Consider the following statements made by prospective jurors in Louisiana. When 
asked about his feeling about the death penalty, one juror responded,  
For all intents and purposes, it’s not so much a moral objection to it. It’s 
a philosophical one. I believe that the spirit of the law initially is not so 
much a punishment for crime but to deter crime, and I don’t think that 
that penalty is successful, and that, and therefore, un-Constitutional [sic], 
really.142  
Another responded, “[I]t’s wrong for any human activity to deliberately foreshorten 
another’s life. Just as murder is wrong I feel the death penalty is wrong. I couldn’t 
be open to imposing the death penalty.”143 
I must pause here a moment to reemphasize that I am not arguing that death-
qualification proceedings present an accurate or complete picture of the American 
moral or constitutional perspective on the death penalty. At a most basic level, death-
qualification proceedings are unrepresentative because they only take place in the 
states—and in the particular counties or cities within those states144—that support the 
death penalty in any form at all and, moreover, that are willing to expend scarce law 
enforcement and prosecutorial resources to pursue it. Additionally, the content of 
death-qualification proceedings will often be affected by the quality of the lawyers 
and judges asking questions, and the “results” of those proceedings may not accu-
rately reflect the full range of community sentiment even in that geographical loca-
tion. Moreover, the jury venires themselves are frequently unrepresentative of the 
local population, often underinclusive of poor and minority residents.145 Other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Jury selection, even outside the capital context, is a unique opportunity for meaningful 
dialogue among citizens. Visit any courtroom during voir dire in a simple drug possession 
case, and you will hear conversations about topics such as the utility and fairness of the war 
on drugs, the proper relationship between mental illness and criminal culpability, the 
trustworthiness of law enforcement, and the overall legitimacy of the criminal-justice system. 
Generally, these conversations have little impact upon the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence because of the vast deference paid to legislative determinations of permissible 
punishment outside the capital context. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–28 
(2003) (plurality opinion) (summarizing jurisprudence on proportionality in noncapital cases, 
emphasizing legislative primacy, and applying heavy deference to state legislature in uphold-
ing constitutionality of California’s three-strikes law); Cover, supra note 138, at 1166–71.  
 142. Transcript of March 16, 2011 at 270, State v. Doyle, 56 So. 3d 948 (La. 2011) (No. 
15-KA-1592). 
 143. Transcript of July 26, 2011 at 243, State v. Mickelson, 149 So. 3d 178 (La. 2014) (No. 
12-KA-2539). 
 144. See Smith, supra note 63 (noting the clustering of death verdicts in a small minority 
of counties nationwide). 
 145. Jury rolls track voter-registration rolls and thus inherit inequalities from the voting 
context, including felon disenfranchisement, residency requirements, and outdated jury lists. 
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dialogues and measurements outside the court system, such as opinion polls, may 
more accurately and inclusively gauge national sentiment.146  
Nonetheless, the distinctive character of the conversation during death-
qualification proceedings warrants consideration. Capital-jury voir dire bears a spe-
cial gravitas—the gravitas borne of participation in actual court proceedings in which 
there is a genuine possibility of becoming a decision maker who might be asked to 
choose between life and death. Consider the following statement by a prospective 
juror in Eric Mickelson’s Louisiana trial, upon being asked whether, “under any 
circumstance [he] could . . . ever impose the death penalty”: 
Prior to today as an intellectual exercise I would have said that there are 
cases where it’s appropriate, but to be honest this is the first time I have 
been confronted with the question where it is not an intellectual exercise, 
and I don’t have a ready answer for you. I would have to think about it.147 
When asked whether he would be able to consider imposing death if the elements of 
first-degree murder at issue in this case were proven, this same potential juror 
responded, 
With no more facts than that I would say that I would be able to consider 
it, but again I’m finding that I’m confronting reality here, and this is liter-
ally life and death and that conceptual description that you have given is 
not enough there for me to answer, there is not enough there for me to 
answer.148  
As these statements illustrate, while there are significant problems with the use of 
capital-jury-selection proceedings as accurate reflections of community sentiment, 
there is also something raw about these proceedings that heightens their salience. For 
those asking and those answering, the cruelty and permissibility of the death penalty 
is not an abstract question but one with real-world consequences. I do not mean to 
overstate capital jurors’ tendency or capacity to internalize the power and 
responsibility they hold over the fate of a human life. Indeed, both social science 
literature149 and legal scholarship150 have compellingly explored the mechanisms of 
law that detach legal actors (including jurors) from the law’s violence—allowing 
them to do, under color of law, things that they could never conceive of doing in 
ordinary life, and absolving them of an inner sense of responsibility for taking actions 
that have brutal effects. Even so, the courtroom setting provides a space for a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. The question of whether opinion polls should also be formally incorporated as “objec-
tive indicia” of “evolving standards of decency” is a subject for another paper—and one that 
has already received consideration from legal scholars and social scientists. See, e.g., Niven et 
al., supra note 14, at 88–89.  
 147. Transcript of July 26, 2011, supra note 143, at 245–46. 
 148. Id. at 256. 
 149. E.g., Bowers & Foglia, supra note 30, at 74–75 (explaining findings, based on capital 
juror interviews, of jurors’ “failure to appreciate their responsibility for the defendant’s 
punishment”).  
 150. E.g., Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
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performative constitutional dialogue that is more solemn, and more deliberative, than 
ordinary conversation.151 
Yet even as the process of death qualification is thus inherently dialogic, under 
the Court’s current approach, the overall impact of death qualification is to serve a 
silencing function in the Eighth Amendment conversation. Perversely, the Court ig-
nores these inherently conversational death-qualification proceedings in determining 
national opinion about the death penalty. Rather than heeding the voices of death 
penalty dissenters in gauging opposition to the death penalty, the courts repress the 
participatory nature of death qualification. Those who give the “wrong” answer are 
silenced—not only stricken from participation in the individual case, but, un-
thinkingly, from participation in the national constitutional conversation, as well.152 
By taking a new approach and accounting for Witherspoon-excluded jurors in the 
Eighth Amendment inquiry into “evolving standards of decency,” the courts would 
be able to distinguish between and ultimately serve two distinct interests: (1) ensur-
ing that jurors follow the law that the legislatures have established, and (2) capturing 
a more inclusive indicator of community sentiment about the death penalty for the 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  
At present, the first interest eclipses the second. The Court has permitted death 
qualification because, in the Court’s view, individuals who are unwilling to substan-
tially consider imposing the death penalty in a particular case are unable to apply the 
law as written.153 This is a case-specific justification for the process of death 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. It seems that even Supreme Court Justices such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia, who have opposed the use of social science data and opinion polls in the “evolving 
standards of decency” inquiry, would respond more positively to a consideration of death-
qualification proceedings under the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, 
expressed a distrust of data obtained from “individuals randomly selected from some segment 
of the population, but who were not actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to the facts 
of an actual case involving the fate of an actual capital defendant.” Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162, 171 (1986). Prospective jurors during death qualification—while not sworn to actual 
jury service in a particular case—nonetheless voice their opinions in a solemn setting in which 
they swear to tell the truth.  
 152. An analogy may be drawn here to the related question of whether to count abolitionist 
states when tallying legislative determinations or trends as objective indicia of “evolving 
standards of decency.” Do nondeath states count when determining the prevalence of a particu-
lar practice within the capital punishment system? Recent Supreme Court decisions have clari-
fied that the answer is yes; if we only considered the choices of death penalty states, we would 
be silencing the nondeath states in the constitutional conversation. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. 
Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014) (“On the other side of the ledger stand the 18 States that have abolished 
the death penalty, either in full or for new offenses, and Oregon, which has suspended the 
death penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40 years.”); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“[T]he . . . Court should have considered those States that had aban-
doned the death penalty altogether as part of the consensus against the juvenile death pen-
alty.”). It should be noted that Justice Alito and three other Justices disagreed with tallying of 
nondeath states, at least in light of the specific evidentiary question posed by that case. Hall, 
134 S. Ct. at 2004–05 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 153. E.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (“[A] juror may not be challenged for 
cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
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qualification, focused on the state’s interest in prosecuting an individual defendant. 
Whether or not we agree with this logic,154 it is clearly related to the juror’s ability 
to make an individualized determination of guilt and punishment in a particular case 
within the confines of the law as it exists. This justification has no bearing on the 
individual’s capacity to participate in a national conversation about the permissibility 
of the death penalty. 
However, the dual use of jury verdicts as “objective indicia” of “evolving 
standards of decency” grafts this case-specific logic onto the constitutional inquiry. 
It removes the most impassioned critics of the decency of the law before measuring 
whether the community believes the law to abide with evolving standards of decency. 
There is no constitutional basis for their removal from the broader conversation. 
To realize a more participatory Eighth Amendment, we must invite these critics 
back into the constitutional conversation by explicitly accounting for them in the 
“evolving standards of decency” calculus—even if we do nothing to change the prac-
tice of striking jurors for cause in individual cases. We need to separate out the 
permissibility of their participation in individual juries from the permissibility of 
their participation in the constitutional dialogue on “evolving standards of decency.” 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s failure to consider death-qualification rates alongside the rate of 
death verdicts in its “evolving standards of decency” analysis leads to a fundamen-
tally flawed estimation of societal values. Death qualification, a practice long justi-
fied on the basis of ensuring an “impartial jury” for the state in individual cases, has 
a biasing effect upon the larger constitutional project of determining whether capital 
punishment constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” The failure to incorporate 
Witherspoon strike rates into the Eighth Amendment inquiry skews the results of that 
inquiry and diminishes the participatory values behind it. 
This Article presents the results of an initial study into the prevalence of 
Witherspoon strikes today. It reports that, across eleven capital trials resulting in 
death verdicts in Louisiana in which 1445 prospective jurors were questioned about 
their views on the death penalty, an average of 22.2% of the venire was struck for 
cause on the basis of opposition to the death penalty. These Witherspoon exclusions, 
moreover, had a disproportionate impact upon African American jurors, eliminating 
36.2% of all African American venire members on this basis. These findings make a 
strong case for the empirical significance of death qualification upon the outcome of 
capital trials and, ultimately, upon the Court’s assessment of the continued 
constitutionality of the death penalty. The time has come to systematically and 
prospectively collect data about Witherspoon strikes and to meaningfully incorporate 
the voices of death penalty dissenters into the determination of the death penalty’s 
constitutionality. 
                                                                                                                 
 
and his oath. The State may insist, however, that jurors will consider and decide the facts 
impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court.”). 
 154. And there is good reason to disagree. See Cohen & Smith, supra note 69, at 117–21 
(describing the traditional function of the jury to decide questions of law in individual cases). 
